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Chapter 1
The Problem of Negative Causation
1.1 Introduction
Causal claims permeate our discourse. We think that causation underlies all change, and
we make causal claims about changes we merely observe and changes we initiate. In a
game of billiards, when the cue ball strikes an object ball and the object ball moves, we
claim that the cue ball caused the object ball to move. Minimally, for any causal claim —
whether the claim is about billiard balls or innumerable other things — we must specify a
cause and an effect. No matter what else we might build in to the formula for causal claims,
these components are required: the thing that causes and the thing that is caused. Without
both elements, the causal claim is incomplete.
This very general characterization of causal claims doesn’t tell us much about the nature
of causation, but it does tell us something. Though we often speak of objects, like billiard
balls, causing and being caused by other objects, we can, as most philosophers are inclined
to do, speak of events. For our earlier example, we might specify that the event of the cue
ball colliding with the object ball caused the event of the object ball moving. But as for our
general formula, it doesn’t matter what kind of things are causes and effects. What matters
is that they are things. Our basic formula requires that we state which things cause what
things.
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The requirements of our basic formula seem too obvious to warrant mentioning, but
there is trouble brewing, even at this most basic level. There are cases of causation where
one or more of the elements of our formula seem to go missing. It is common to talk about
what doesn’t happen causing that which does and to talk about what does happen causing
that which doesn’t. Examples abound. A lack of rain causes forest fires and poor harvests.
Pushing the emergency stop on an industrial machine can prevent accidents. Brushing with
a fluoride toothpaste can prevent cavities. Each of these cases describes a scenario where
we are inclined to judge that an absence either causes or is caused. These are paradigm
cases of a seemingly ubiquitous phenomenon — negative causation. Negative causation is
either by prevention — causation of an absence — or omission — causation by an absence.
We can also have prevention by omission. In short, negative causation occurs any time we
have an absence as a cause, effect, or both.
Our grammar hides the trouble with negative causation; we say that ‘an absence of
rain’ caused the forest fire. We use articles, definite and indefinite, to indicate absences –
but what is being indicated? On the face of it, it seems that an ‘absence of rain’ is not a
metaphysically respectable thing at all. An absence is not a ‘nothing.’ It isn’t even an it,
or so the opponents of negative causation would argue. If the opposition is correct, then
negative causal claims are not causal claims, not complete ones anyway. One or more of
the essential components of our basic causal formal are apparently missing.
Perhaps, as some have argued, we should abandon the possibility of negative causation.
Thus, a great many of our intuitive causal judgments are incorrect. However, common sense
strongly suggests that many of the changes we observe and initiate are either the result of
or result in absences. And change is what causation is all about. I contend that common
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sense should not be abandoned. In this dissertation, I argue that negative causal claims can
be complete and true causal claims. That is, negative causation is genuine causation.
I argue that the barrier to accounting negative causation as real causation issues from
a misunderstanding of absences. I agree with our basic formula: Causal claims require
things for both cause and effect. I disagree with the assertion that such things cannot be
supplied by negative causal claims. Thus, much of the work of this dissertation is clarifying
and defending what I take to be the proper understanding of ‘absences.’ Roughly and to
be clarified in later chapters, I argue that absences — those that are intuitively taken to be
causes or effects — are not metaphysical absences. Rather, such ‘absences’ feature in neg-
ative descriptions of ordinary positive causes. The core of my view is that negative causal
statements can be true and express genuine causal relations in virtue of having positive en-
tities as the truthmakers. The negative of negative causation is merely apparent. Negative
causal statements can be grounded in an ontology that consists of only positive entities.
In this dissertation, I do not attempt a general analysis of causation, nor do I aim to
provide a general theory of causation. Rather, my analysis is offered to clarify both what
absences are (or are not) and what causal role absences can play. Since I do not offer a
proprietary theory of causation, I nest this analysis within extant accounts of causation.
I demonstrate that absences can be consistently accounted as causes and effects across a
variety of theories of causation. The crucial insight is that negative causation does not
require any special treatment; there is no ‘special problem’ of negative causation. Negative
causal claims specify causes or effects with negative descriptions, positive causal claims do
so with positive descriptions.
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1.2 The problem with negative causation
Following convention, I label the view that negative causation is genuine causation, genuin-
ism. Given the cases mentioned above and the countless others that could be added to the
list, it seems that genuinism needs little defense. However, genuinism has met with much
philosophical scorn. Unfortunately for our ubiquitous phenomenon, many philosophers
— if not most who write on the subject — reject the idea that ‘negative causation’ is real
causation. After all, the adage ex nihilo nihil fit is well-entrenched in both philosophy and
common sense. Presumably, absences are just nothing, and nothings cannot be causally
productive (neither does it seem that a nothing could be produced). Simply attempting to
talk about ‘nothings’ as capable of being produced or being productive is to speak non-
sense. To produce nothing is simply not to produce and to be produced by nothing is to not
be produced. Clearly, if we understand absences as ‘nothings,’ a defense of genuinism is a
loosing battle.
By way of a preview, this is precisely understanding of absences that I plan to challenge.
I think that absences, at least those ubiquitous and intuitively causal ones, aren’t ‘nothings’
— not metaphysically anyway. But more on that later. First and foremost, this dissertation
is a defense of the commonsense view that negative causal statements can be true and
express genuine causal relations. I offer an analysis of negative causation that gives the
best account of negative causation that is both intuitively and theoretically tenable.
This defense is essential as philosophical scrutiny of negative causation issues a num-
ber of deep problems. As I suggested earlier, genuinism runs afoul of well-established
philosophical principles. Together, these principles are the foundation of the relationalist
view of causation. The most central principle is, quite simply, that causation is a relation.
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Two corollary principles clarify the view: (a) Relations require entities for relata; and, (b)
There are no negative entities. Relationalism admits of a great variety of disparate theories
of causation, including everything from most counterfactual theories to persistence theo-
ries of causation. Indeed, the commitment to relationalism, even if only implicitly, is so
widespread that relationalism is the closest thing to philosophical orthodoxy we have in
contemporary philosophy of causation.1
On the face of it, relationalism entails that omission and prevention cases are not cases
of genuine causation. Absences can be neither causes nor effects simply because they aren’t
things, and causation — a relation — needs things for relata. And it doesn’t matter what
you take those relata to be — facts, events, objects, states of affairs, or whatever; an absence
is, presumably, the non-existence of a whatever. Thus, our theoretical commitments are
inconsistent with our intuitive judgments about omissions and preventions.
To resolve the inconsistency, we have a few options.
1. Relationalism is false and genuinism is true.
2. Relationalism is true and genuinism is false.
3. Relationalism and genuinism are consistent (and true).
1. For a sample of adherents to relationalism see: D. M. Armstrong, A World of States
of Affairs (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Helen Beebee, “Causing and
Nothingness,” in Causation and Counterfactuals, ed. Ned Hall John Collins and L. A.
Paul (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004); Donald Davidson, “Causal Relations,” The Jour-
nal of Philosophy 64, no. 21 (1967): 691–703; Phil Dowe, “A Counterfactual Theory of
Prevention and ‘Causation’ by Omission,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79, no. 2
(2001): 216–226; David Lewis, “Causation,” The Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 17 (1973):
556–567; Dissenters most notably include: David Lewis, “Causation as Influence,” Jour-
nal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 182–197; D. H. Mellor, “For Facts as Cause and Effects,”
in Causation and Counterfactuals, ed. Ned Hall John Collins and L. A. Paul (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 2004).
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Relationalism is false and genuinism is true.
If we take this option, then we reject the first principle. If causation is not a relation, then
we need not seek relata. If we take this approach, aptly named non-relationalism, then it
doesn’t matter that absences are not entities. If causation is not a relation, then we do not
need entities as relata for any particular case of causation. This approach has prominent
advocates, including D.H. Mellor and David Lewis.2 This approach requires a significant
revision of our understanding of causation, a revision that should not be undertaken lightly.
Generally, I assume relationalism is true, and my primary goal is to demonstrate that
relationalism and genuinism, properly understood, are consistent. However, I take care to
justify this assumption to highlight the need to reconcile relationalism and genuinism. In
chapter two, I argue that the primary motivation for non-relationalism is the preservation
of our genuinist intuitions. Thus, if we can preserve genuinism from with the relationalist
framework, then the motivation for non-relationalism is severely undermined. Furthermore,
non-relationalism has a difficult theoretical row to hoe. For one, we ordinarily speak of
causation as we do any other relation. The grammar and usage of causal claims is consistent
with the grammar and usage of any other relational claim. Thus, there is a strong intuition
that causation is a relation. Furthermore, if we reject the relational nature of causation, it
is quite difficult to say how cause and effect are connected if they are not related. That is,
once we deny that causation is a relation, it is quite difficult to say what causation is. The
various non-relationalist accounts have little to add here, other than to insist that whatever
causation is, it isn’t essentially relational.
2. Mellor, see n. 1; Lewis, “Causation as Influence,” see n. 1; David Lewis, “Void
and Object,” in Causation and Counterfactuals, ed. Ned Hall John Collins and L. A. Paul
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004).
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In chapter two, I develop these two concerns to establish the prima facie case for rela-
tionalism. However, I do not attempt to mount a full refutation of non-relationalism, as this
would take me to far afield of the issue of negative causation. Rather, I am content to pro-
vide the prima facie reasons to accept relationalism and undermine the primary motivation
for rejecting it.
Relationalism is true and genuinism is false.
This is the most common response to the putative inconsistency between relationalism and
genuinism. On this approach, we must hold that our intuitive judgments about negative
causation are false. Despite appearances, absences are neither causes nor effects. There is
no negative causation, and common sense is mistaken. This approach is favored by most
critics of genuinism, most notably and recently, Helen Beebee and Phil Dowe.3 If absences
are causes, proponents of this option argue, then there must be negative entities. At best,
this is metaphysically perverse; at worst, it is incoherent. Just think: Absences, things that
don’t exist, exist. Thus, if absences are non-entities, then there is no negative causation.
Denying genuinism has its costs. Commonsense is quite ready to judge that absences
are causes. Even if claiming that ‘an absence of rain caused the forest fire’ sounds odd,
we would not hesitate to claim that ‘the drought caused the forest fire.’ Unfortunately,
‘drought’ is simply a word to describe a prolonged absence of rain. Such rampant error
deserves explanation. Helen Beebee and Achille Varzi claim that we confuse causation with
3. Beebee, see n. 1; Dowe, “A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and ‘Causation’
by Omission,” see n. 1; Phil Dowe, “Causation and Misconnections,” Philosophy of Science
71, no. 5 (2004): 926–931.
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causal explanation.4 Thus, absences can figure into causal explanations of events, but not in
virtue of being causes or effects. Rather, claims about absences provide causal information.
Phil Dowe offers an alternate explanation, and claims that we confuse causation with quasi-
causation, a closely related but decidedly non-causal concept.5 Quasi-causation, according
to Dowe, is possible but not actual causation. Absences quasi-cause and are quasi-caused,
but they do not cause and are not caused.
If either Beebee or Dowe are correct, then we have a nice starting point for relational-
ism. Only entities can be causes or effects, and when we mistakenly judge a non-entity to
be such, we have an explanation for our mistake. However, I argue that both explanations
fail. In chapter three, I argue that Beebee’s explanation that absences cannot figure into
causal explanations unless a cause is specified. This leaves two options: Either absences
cannot figure into causal explanations, or we can specify causes and effects by speaking of
absences. The former is surely false, and the latter entails my thesis. If a cause is speci-
fied by an absence in a negative causal claim, then that negative causal claim is true and
expresses a causal relation. Furthermore, Beebee’s approach only handles cases where we
judge that an absence is a cause, not those where we judge that an absence is an effect. An
attempt by Achille Varzi to extend Beebee’s account to handle preventions cases, where an
absence is judged to be the effect, fails. Fortunately for my account, it fails in instructive
ways. Varzi’s attempt helps to demonstrate how an absence specifies a positive entity.
4. Beebee, see n. 1; Achille Varzi, “Omissions and Causal Explanations,” in Agency
and Causation in the Human Sciences, ed. Francesca Castellani and Joseph Quitterer
(Paderborn: Mentis Verlag, 2007).
5. Dowe, “A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and ‘Causation’ by Omission,” see
n. 1.
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In chapter four, I argue that Dowe offers a solution in need of a problem. He formulates
two general arguments against genuinism and offers his theory of quasi-causation as an
alternative. However, I argue that even if these arguments succeed, quasi-causation doesn’t
solve any problems, it merely moves them. Quasi-causation inherits many of the difficulties
that Dowe credits to genuinism, and quasi-causation becomes a placeholder for those cases
which don’t fit neatly into his relationalist account of causation. Fortunately, I argue that
when ‘absences’ are properly understood, not as non-entities, but as negative descriptions
of entities, then there is no need to introduce quasi-causation.
The moral of chapters three and four is that if relationalism straightforwardly precludes
negative causation, then commonsense is very often in error and we have little to say about
why such errors are so commonplace. But if causation is a relation, and relations require
entities, then what option do we have to vindicate commonsense?
Relationalism and genuinism are consistent (and true).
I have already suggested and rejected one way to render relationalism and genuinism con-
sistent: we could postulate negative entities. That is, we could maintain that absences are
either events, objects, or states of affairs, capable of serving as relata. I argue throughout
that this option is unnecessary and philosophically unpalatable. 6
The option I favor challenges the inconsistency of genuinism and relationalism head on.
I think that the critics and proponents of negative causation alike have mistakenly assumed
that the ‘negative’ in negative causation is well-understood. More specifically, I do not
suppose that the intuitive case for negative causation suggests much at all about the nature
6. Alternately, we could deny that relations require relata, however, the principle that
relations require relata seems analytically true if any is. I don’t consider the possibility
seriously.
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of absences. Rather, the intuitive case suggests that certain objects, events, or whatever
which we commonly call absences, can either cause or be caused. I take this as my starting
point. Though philosophers on the subject of causation generally assume that there is
a distinction between negative and positive causation, a survey of the literature provides
little guidance for determining whether some putative absence is a genuine metaphysical
absence. Since analyses of causation typically begin with an assessment of intuitive cases,
we need to be able to determine whether a particular case is really an instance of negative
causation before much progress can be made on the general issue.
In chapters three and four, as I assess and respond to alternatives to genuinism, I sketch
the outline of my proposal. I argue that the putative inconsistency between genuinism and
relationalism is merely apparent. We can preserve our theoretical, relationalist commit-
ments and vindicate our intuitive judgments that absences cause and are caused.
In chapter five, I carefully lay out the requirements for an account of genuinism sans
negative entities that is consistent with relationalism. In order to lay out these requirements,
I nest the development of my proposal from within the framework of David Armstrong’s
theory of singular causation. The reasons for this are two fold: One, his account pays close
attention to the ontological commitments of a causal claim. This enables me to spell out
my account of genuinism in a way that clearly demonstrates that negative causal claims can
specify ordinary positive entities. Two, his account is among the most restrictive and least
amenable to genuinism. His ontological requirements are quite strict. If I can show that
genuinism can meet these strict requirements, the application of my account to other, less
restrictive accounts should be quite apparent.
I close chapter five with a careful characterization of my account of genuinism, given
the demands of Armstrong’s account. I suggest how my account might work given other
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accounts of causation both in chapter five and throughout the dissertation. For example, in
chapter four, I suggest how my account applies to a process or persistence theory of cau-
sation. However, the full development of my account waits until chapter five. The rough
idea is that negative causal statements — those that assert causation by either omission or
prevention — can be true in virtue of specifying the actual causal relata by some nega-
tive description. Thus, we can maintain our principles without claiming that our intuitive
judgments about omissions and preventions are false. We preserve the truth of our intuitive
judgments about negative causation without violating the core propositions of relational-
ism.
Also in chapter 5, I argue that this can be done with ontological seriousness. One of
the central objections to genuinism is that it results in an untenable ontological explosion.
Consider a paradigm example negative causation that I frequently employ in this disserta-
tion: My failure to water my houseplant caused the plant to wilt. The problem is that if
it is true that my failure to water the plant is a cause of the plant’s death, then so too for
everyone else’s failure to water the plant. It seems that if we accept my failure as a cause,
then we multiply the causes of the plant’s death many times over, if not infinitely. I show
that this problem is illusory if we accept my analysis of negative causation.
The crucial insight of this dissertation is that negative causation requires no special
treatment. We can account for it as we ordinarily account for uncontroversial cases of
positive causation. No doubt, it is unclear how we should account for positive causation.
The moral is that accounting negative causation as genuine causation creates no additional
problems. The two most significant challenges I face are these: I must be able to show that
negative causation is consistent with relationalism without postulating negative entities,
and I must be able to show this without triggering an ontological explosion of causes. I
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focus on meeting these challenges throughout the dissertation: Negative causal statements
can be true and express genuine causal relations by specifying entities as causes or effects
via a negative description. Any explosion of causes is merely apparent. At worst, we suffer
an explosion of causal descriptions, but our causal ontology remains properly constrained.
1.3 Motivations for genuinism
In the previous section, I sketched the challenges that face genuinism and how I will meet
those challenges. In this section I expand on the motivation for meeting those challenges.
Vindicating commonsense is admirable, but I do not think that it is reason enough. More
importantly, causal judgment and reasoning plays a central role in many domains of in-
quiry. Various theories of ethics, epistemology, and perception, to name a few, maintain
causal conditions as a vital component. For example, a causal condition for perception is
well-accepted and, though there is less agreement, a causal condition for moral responsi-
bility is commonplace in the literature and intuitively well-motivated. And in each of these
domains — and perhaps many others — rejecting the possibility of negative causation is a
severe theoretical handicap. In this section, I will give an overview of the commitment to
the causal condition in both perception and moral responsibility. I go on to highlight the
implications of rejecting negative causation for each.
1.3.1 Causation and Perception
Following Grice (1961), the vast majority of theorists maintain a causal requirement for
perception. Grice argues that there must be a causal connection between the perception
that x is F and x’s being F. Grice writes,
[F]or an object to be perceived by X, it is sufficient that it should be causally
involved in the generation of some sense-impression by X in the kind of way in
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which, for example, when I look at my hand in good light, my hand is causally
responsible for its looking to me as if there were a hand before me.7
The Gricean idea is straight-forward. For it to be true that I see my hand before me,
then my hand must be causally responsible in whatever way required by the relevant sense
modality for its looking to me as if my hand is before me. In a similar spirit, P.F. Strawson
(1974) offers a more specific formulation of the causal condition:
It is a necessary condition of an M-experience being the M-perception it seems
to be that the experience should be causally dependent on appropriate M-facts.8
In the spirit of the Gricean condition, it is a necessary condition of a hand-experience
being the hand-experience it seems to be that the experience should be causally dependent
on the appropriate hand-facts. The two passages presented here are canonical statements of
the causal condition of perception, a condition that enjoys a rare philosophical consensus.
This is trouble for the critics of negative causation. It is obvious that I can see that the
room is dark and I can see that there is a pothole in the road. But darkness and holes aren’t
things; they are absences of things, light and pieces of the road, respectively. Return to
Strawson’s formulation of the causal condition as applied to perception of the dark room:
It is a necessary condition of a dark-room-experience being the dark-room-experience it
seems to be that the experience is causally dependent on the appropriate dark-room-facts.
But ‘dark-room-facts’ are not facts at all, since talk about darkness is talk about light-room-
facts that do not obtain. The upshot is that if the causal condition for perception is correct
and absences aren’t causes, then we can’t see what we surely do, dark rooms and potholes.
7. H. P. Grice, “The Causal Theory of Perception,” Aristotelian Society: Supplemen-
tary Volume Suppl 35 (1961): 142–143.
8. P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (London: Methuen,
1974): 71.
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1.3.2 Causation and Moral Responsibility
Intuitively, we can only be held morally responsible for some consequence if we — at
least partly — brought it about. As Carolina Sartorio notes in a recent essay, “The thesis
that [Moral] responsibility for outcomes requires causation is widespread among philoso-
phers.”9 Imagine being held responsible for some outcome O when nothing you did or
failed to do brought O about! The idea is just that we can only be held responsible for
something if we are connected to it in the right way, and the natural candidate for that way
is a causal connection.
To highlight our commitment to the causal condition for moral responsibility, consider
the following case, cited by Judith Jarvis Thomson in her (1984).
Summers-v-Tice: Plaintiff Summers had gone hunting with the defendants
Tice and Simonson. A bird was flushed and both Tice and Simonson fired neg-
ligently in the direction of Summers. As a result, a single bit of shot became
lodged in one of Summers’s eyes. Forensic evidence was unable to determine
from whose gun the shot originated. Both defendants were equidistant from
Summers, and it was equally likely that the shot originated from Tice as Si-
monson. The courts found both defendants “jointly and severally liable.”10
The upshot of this case is that someone is being held liable for a harm he didn’t cause,
yet we are not inclined to regard the court’s judgment as a great injustice. After all, both
Tice and Simonson acted negligently, and either one could have caused the harm. Off
hand, it seems that this case suggests that we should give up on the causal condition. But,
I maintain, as does Thomson, that our judgment about this case turns on mere epistemic
concerns.
9. Carolina Sartorio, “How To Be Responsible For Something Without Causing It,”
Philosophical Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2004): 316.
10. Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Remarks on Causation and Liability,” Philosophy and
Public Affairs 13, no. 2 (1984): 102–104.
14
Thomson goes on to consider a hypothetical version of the Summers case where our
intuitions depart from the verdict. Imagine a qualitatively identical case, except that, sud-
denly, during the trial new evidence is discovered which determines that the shot came
from Tice’s gun. Our intuitions shift. Now we are disinclined to hold Simonson “jointly
and severally liable.” Sure, we would hold Simonson morally responsible for something,
his negligent shooting, but not the consequence in question, the injury to Summers’s eye.
The difference is a difference of causality. If there is no causal condition for morality, then
we can’t explain why our judgment shifts once we know whose gunshot caused the harm.
But if we endorse the causal condition and deny the possibility of negative causation, then
we are unable to explain why we are so often morally responsible for consequences that
result from what we do not do. If I fail to water my plant, I am morally responsible for its
death. This is even clearer in more tragic cases, like those of parental neglect.
1.3.3 So What?
I do not intend to try to defend the causal conditions for either perception or moral respon-
sibility, and any attempt to do so is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, what
this discussion should galvanize is the need to take seriously our intuitive negative causal
judgments. The implications of denying genuinism involve more than merely shrugging
off our commonsense negative causal judgments. Causation matters, and denying nega-
tive causation will significantly affect the implications of any theory which makes essential
use of causation. The goal of the previous section was merely to ward off any notion that
the issue of negative causation has only narrow metaphysical interest. Negative causation
matters.
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Chapter 2
Causation: Relationalism v. Non-Relationalism
The central concern of this dissertation is what I will call the problem of the missing re-
lata. This, I take it, is the fundamental difficulty facing genuinism. As I suggested in the
previous chapter, the relation causation needs relata. Thus, the overarching goal of this
dissertation is to find those relata in a manner that does not postulate negative entities or
trigger an ontological explosion of causes. That is, the goal is to find metaphysically re-
spectable relata. In the face of a daunting search, we should always ask whether it is worth
undertaking. Do we need to solve the problem of the missing relata, or can we just take an
end run around it? To deny relationalism is to take such a run.
No doubt, it is most natural to regard causation as a relation. We certainly speak as if
it is. The way we use ‘causation’ mirrors our usage of any other relational term. Uncon-
troversially, we say that “Sam in the father of Sue” and this statement expresses the dyadic
relation ‘x is the father of y’ as being predicated by the ordered pair (Sam, Sue). Causal
statements bear an analogous structure. When we say that “The barking dog caused the cat
to flee” we appear to express the causal relation as being predicated by the relevant ordered
pair. We can, at this point, leave the nature of the ordered pair ambiguous. They could
be objects, events, or whatever. No mater their nature, the relata must exist if the causal
relation does.
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Throughout the dissertation, I generally assume that causation is a relation. In this chap-
ter, I justify this assumption. In section one, I lay out the prima facie case for relationalism.
Following Jerrold Aronson, I demonstrate that causation, following its ordinary usage, is
a “dimension-word.”1 It is a general term encompassing a variety of more specific words,
like make, push, pull, etc. The claim is that causation is the general category of relations,
which we broadly employ when we wish to express the fact that one thing (e.g., an event)
makes another thing. I highlight that we also use such terms when the thing is made by an
absence. I further show that this usage also encompasses our usage of prevents — when
the thing made is an absence.
While language might guide our metaphysical theorizing, it won’t settle anything. In
section two, I review the primary motivation for non-relationalism. Central to the case for
non-relationalism is the need to account for cases of negative causation. Thus, if we have
to pick between relationalism and negative causation, the non-relationalists take negative
causation. However, in doing so, they are forced to recognize far more negative causation
than commonsense suggests. In saving some of our intuitions regarding negative causation,
they are forced to violate many more. For example, to save the intuition that my failure to
water my houseplant caused it to die, the non-relationalist must reject the intuition that
President Obama’s failure to my houseplant didn’t cause it to die.
The account of negative causation that I offer preserves our basic usage of causation as
a relation, and consistently includes negative causation. The key is that it does so without
the unpalatable conclusion that Obama’s failure to water my houseplant caused it die. This
chapter does not provide a full refutation of non-relationalism, but defends relationalism
1. Jerrold Aronson, “On the Grammar of ‘Cause’,” Synthese 22 (1971): 414–430.
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by constructing a prima facie case for it and undermining the crucial motivation for non-
relationalism.
2.1 The Prima Facie Case for Relationalism: The Grammar of ‘Cause’
Though an understanding of causation is evasive, we nevertheless manage to communicate
using causal language. Aronson claims that ‘cause’ is a dimension-word. Borrowing from
Austin (1962), a dimension-word is one that “serves as ‘the most general and comprehen-
sive term in a whole group of terms of the same kind, terms that fulfill the same function.”’
The class covered by ‘cause’ is a set of transitive verbs, like, push, pull, drop, makes, etc.
The rule is that a transitive verb is a member of this class if it can be replaced with ‘cause’
when accompanied by certain other modifications. For example, ‘I dropped the ball on the
ground’ can be transformed into ‘John caused the ball to be on the ground.’
Aronson specifies the general formulas for the transformation.2 Sentences with the
following syntax:
Noun Phrase + Transitive Verb + Direct Object + Objective Complement
can be replaced by:
Noun Phrase + caused + Direct Object + Copula + Objective Complement
The presence of the objective complement is what matters. The objective complement
tells us what the direct object has become or what has become of the direct object.3
2. Aronson, see n. 1: 417.
3. Aronson notes an exception to this rule, but it is a minor one. “Transitive verbs such
as ‘know’, ‘found’, ‘call’, etc. take objective complements, but they can not be replaced by
‘cause’. For example, ‘he found my remarks intelligible’ is not transformationally related
to ‘He caused my remarks to be intelligible’. However, transitive verbs such as these can be
reparsed in such a way as to eliminate the objective complement in favor of an appositive
clause. Thus, ‘We thought his remarks unkind’ can be changed to ‘We thought that his
remarks were unkind’, whereas ’John knocked the book on the floor’ can not under go
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This comports with the view that causation is about change. Causal claims involve
something — specified by a noun phrase — changing another thing — specified by the
direct object. The objective complement gives us information about the change that has
taken place. Aronson’s point is straightforward — transitive verbs which take an objective
complement are causal verbs.
Aronson takes care to elucidate the grammar of ‘cause’ for very specific purposes. He
argues that a manipulationist account of causation is inadequate, since many causal verbs
are well outside the scope of agential manipulation. However, contemporary manipula-
tionist accounts of causation have addressed this worry, and it is beyond the scope of this
dissertation.4 Fortunately, Aronson’s clear presentation of the grammar of ‘cause’ is illu-
minating for present purposes.
If causation is relational, then so are each of the specific causal transitive verbs. A
counterexample, a non-relational causal verb, would settle the issue and demonstrate that
causation is not essentially relational. However, no counterexample is readily available. If
an object is kicked across the room, there must be a kicker. The entailment from ‘an object
is kicked’ to ’something kicked an object’ holds in virtue of the relational nature of kicking.
The same can be said for each of the causal verbs so far mentioned, and, it seems, the same
could be said for any such verb.
the same conversion. In other words, transitive verbs such as ‘know’, ‘see’, etc. are not
really factitive verbs, and the objective complements in these cases do not really denote
any significant change in the object that is due to such things as ‘seeing’ and ‘knowing.’
Aronson, see n. 1: 418.
4. See: James Woodward, Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Judea Pearl, Causality: Models, Reasoning,
and Inference (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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However, it does not follow from the absence of a counterexample that causation is
essentially relational. Even if we succeeded in cataloging every causal verb and determined
each to be relational, we could not catalog every possible causal verb. However, the absence
of a counterexample and many clear examples of relational causal verbs provides a strong
prima facie case for the relational nature of causation. Causation is but a general term for
a collection of functionally similar transitive verbs — a collection composed of essentially
relational verbs.
2.2 The Case Against Non-Relationalism
In spite of the prima facie case for relationalism, the claim that causation is essentially
relational is defeasible. David Lewis argues that the inability to account for negative cau-
sation in a relationalist framework is evidence against relationalism.5 Lewis offers a non-
relationalist alternative. His provides the crucial feature of non-relationalism: Causation
does not always relate entities.
As we have seen, commonsense is inclined to judge that absences often cause and are
often caused. However, if causation is relational, then causal claims require a noun phrase,
a direct object, and an objective complement. That is, causal claims require things as cause
and effect. For cases of negative causation, one or both of the required relata are missing. In
spite of this, Lewis grants evidential weight to our commonsense judgments about negative
causation. We can cite many examples where absences seem to play the very same causal
role as uncontroversial occurrences. Consider an example, ‘Smoking causes heart disease.’
Since smoking likely prevents the normal function of the heart, the effect of smoking is an
absence — an absence which also seems to have a variety of effects, like death. The upshot
5. Lewis, “Void and Object,” see n. 2; Lewis, “Causation as Influence,” see n. 1.
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is that heart disease is really just an absence, a non-entity, which we, nevertheless, judge to
be a genuine effect of smoking. Lewis argues that,
We could deny, in the face of compelling evidence to the contrary, that absences
ever cause anything. We could deny, for instance, that the void is deadly....
Simply to state this response is to complete the reductio against it.6
Thus, if relationalism entails that there is no negative causation, then the evidence in
favor of negative causation is sufficient to warrant the denial of relationalism.
In light of the tension between the relational account of causation and our common-
sense judgments that negative causation is genuine causation, Helen Beebee notes three
possible solutions.7 The first solution, which she accepts, maintains the relationalist model
and denies that absences are causes. The second solution rejects the relationalist model
in favor of non-relationalism where causation is not essentially relational and affirms our
commonsense judgments that absences are often causes and effects.8
The third solution, which is suggested and rejected by Lewis in “Void and Object,”
attempts to reconcile the relationalist model with our commonsense judgments. On this
approach, one would claim that the most basic causal facts are relational and then attempt to
define negative causation in terms of relational causation. If we opt for this option as Lewis
describes it, then absences are really just uncontroversial everyday objects. For instance,
holes are just made of their surroundings. “Strange to say,” Lewis notes, “some holes are
made of cheese and some of limestone! Strange to say, no holes are exactly where we would
have thought they were!”9 Put this way, this option is clearly unacceptable. However, this
6. Lewis, “Void and Object,” see n. 2: 281.
7. Beebee, see n. 1.
8. This is the solution developed in Lewis, “Causation as Influence,” see n. 1.
9. Lewis, “Void and Object,” see n. 2: 282.
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is only one way of reconciling the relationalist model with our intuitive judgments. On the
strategy sketch in later chapters, we might say that an absence is a cause or an effect just in
case such a negative causal statement has as its truthmaker uncontroversial, causally related
entities. More on this later. (In short, I find Lewis’s rejection of the third solution to quick.)
In “Causing and Nothingness,” Beebee’s central contention is that, for commonsense’s
part, it doesn’t much matter whether we choose the relational or the non-relational view.
She argues that neither view respects our commonsense judgments about negative causa-
tion. The relationalist straightforwardly denies that many intuitively causal absences are
causes. Consider one of Beebee’s examples. Jones was supposed to close the fire door; he
fails to do so and a fire results. Commonsense judges that Jones’s failure is a cause of of
the fire. The relationalist holds commonsense in error.
However, the non-relationalist view affirms that many absences are causes when com-
monsense would judge that they are not. On Lewis’s account, for example, causation is
the ancestral of counterfactual dependence. In light of this, Beebee continues the Jones
example to consider Brown, who lives on the other side of the city and also fails to close
the fire door. Since the fire wouldn’t have occurred if either Jones or Brown had closed the
fire door, the failures of both are equally causes on the non-relationalist view. However,
commonsense would deny that Brown’s failure is also a cause. The moral of the story is
that both views, relationalism and non-relationalism, fail to respect commonsense.
If we give commonsense judgments the sort of evidential status that Lewis does, then
non-relationalism is no better off than relationalism. We can apply Lewis’s reductio to
non-relationalism as well. We could deny, in the face of compelling evidence to the con-
trary, that people who don’t close fire doors in other cities cause fires in those cities. This,
it seems, completes the reductio against non-relationalism. The success of this version
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of Lewis’s reductio against his own account crucially depends on the claim that non-
relationalism fails to respect commonsense. In the next section, I look more closely at
Beebee’s defense of this claim.
2.2.1 No Respect for Commonsense
The desideratum for non-relationalism is the preservation of our commonsense causal judg-
ments. We have a body of evidence that absences are often causes and effects. Consider our
earlier examples: Smoking causes an absence of proper heart function and droughts — an
absence of rain — cause forest fires and poor harvests. But we have an equally compelling
body of evidence that not all absences are causes: My failure to irrigate distant drought
stricken fields is not a cause of poor harvests in far off lands.
This is where Beebee sets her hooks against non-relationalism. Beebee argues that
commonsense judgments are very often tainted with normative considerations, considera-
tions that make no metaphysical difference. Commonsense denies that Brown’s failure to
close the fire door caused the fire because there is no sense in which Brown should have
closed the door. Jones, on the other hand, should have. If Beebee has diagnosed our com-
monsense judgments correctly, then metaphysicians do not have to respect them. Beebee
puts the point thusly, “But no philosopher working within the tradition I’m concerned with
here think that the truth conditions for causal claims contain a moral element.1011 Beebee
concludes that any metaphysical theory of causation must reject some commonsense judg-
10. Well, almost no philosophers. Sarah McGrath develops an account according to
which the truthmakers for negative causal claims are essentially normative. Sarah Mc-
Grath, “Causation By Omission: A Dilemma,” Philosophical Studies 123, no. 1-2 (2005):
125–148.
11. Beebee, see n. 1, 293.
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ments and that relationalism and non-relationalism merely differ about which judgments to
respect.
To further her case against non-relationalism, Beebee attempts to formulate a definition
of non-relational negative causation. The moral is that that commonsense judgments about
which absences are causes and which are not depend on factors that are implausible meta-
physical considerations. To begin, she offers a simple counterfactual definition of causation
by an absence:
The nonoccurrence of an event type A caused event b if and only if, had an
A-type event occurred, b would not have occurred.12
If we consider paradigm cases of absences as causes that commonsense judgments are
likely to consider cases of genuine causation, the above definition tracks commonsense.
Beebee consider four such examples.13
1. Flora normally waters her neighbor’s flowers. But Flora stops watering them and
they die. Commonsense affirms that Flora’s failure to water the plant is a cause of
their death.
2. Zeb’s dog is bitten by an insect and contracts an eye disease. Zeb neglects the dog
and does not treat the disease and the dog goes blind. Commonsense affirms that
Zeb’s negligence is a cause of the dog’s blindness.
3. A decaying tree falls in a national forest and destroys some rare wild flowers. The
park ranger failed to inspect the tree. Commonsense affirms that the park ranger’s
failure caused the death of the wild flowers.
12. Beebee, see n. 1: 294.
13. Ibid.: 294.
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4. A tropical plant survives a London winter because it was abnormally warm and there
was no frost. Commonsense affirms that the lack of frost caused the plant’s survival.
The above definition satisfies our commonsense judgments about each of previous four
cases. But the definition also applies to a host of absences that are not intuitively causal. For
the first example, if we count Flora’s failure to water the flowers as a cause of their death,
we must also count the other neighbors’ failures to water the flowers — not to mention
the failures of people in foreign countries. For the second example, if we admit Zeb’s
negligence as a cause, we must also consider the failures of everyone else who didn’t treat
the dog as a cause of his blindness. Similarly, I didn’t inspect the tree in the national forest
and a gust of wind didn’t blow the decaying tree the other direction. And my inspection and
the gust of wind would have prevented the death of the rare wild flowers. Beebee continues
for the fourth example: if the absence of frost caused the survival of the tropical plant, then
so did the absence of a hungry tropical plant-eating koala.14 But none of these absences
are intuitively considered causes.
In order to weed out spurious causal absences, we must introduce additional criteria.
A standard such criterion is suggested by Hart and Honore´15 Call this the abnormality
criterion: The non-occurrence of an event type A caused event b if and only if, had an
A-type event occurred, b would not have occurred and event type A normally occurs. This
gives the right result in our paradigm examples. Flora’s failure to water the flowers is a
cause of their death because she normally waters them; everyone else’s failure is not a
14. Beebee, see n. 1: 295.
15. H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honore´, Causation in the Law (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1985).
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cause since they do not normally water the flowers. Similarly for our other absences. No
one expects to see a tropical-plant-eating koala in London, but we do expect frost.
However, Beebee argues that abnormality criterion flies in the face of many other com-
monsense judgments, even though it does well by our for paradigm cases. Commonsense
judges Zeb a cause of the dog’s blindness even if Zeb is normally negligent. Here we must
appeal to a moral norm. Zeb’s history of care not withstanding, he should have taken care
of his dog’s health. In other cases, the norm is epistemic. If a drug manufacturer produces a
drug with a serious side effect that the manufacturer could not have foreseen, we would not
consider the manufacturer’s failure to warn users of the side-effect a cause of the malady.
Beebee argues that these considerations prompt a more complicated definition of cau-
sation by absence:
(II) The nonoccurence of an event type A caused event b if and only if
(i) b counterfactually depends on the absence: Had an A-type event occurred,
b would not have occurred; and
(ii) the absence of an A-type event is either abnormal or violates some moral,
legal, epistemic, or other norm.16
This definition seems to get the analysis of our commonsense judgments about absences
as causes right. However, Beebee claims that it is hardly satisfactory as a metaphysical
account of causation. If correct, the truth conditions of causal statements would depend
crucially on human-dependent norms. While this might be bad enough to damn the com-
monsense approach to metaphysics, Beebee notes that the revised definition would make
the truth of causal statements a relative matter. We might differ with regard to our epis-
temic norms. But even if there are objective epistemic norms, it would nonetheless make
causation relative to a particular set of norms. The absence of some event might be a gen-
uine cause given some set of moral norms, but not a genuine cause given some other set
16. Beebee, see n. 1: 296.
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of norms. Though Beebee does not explicitly give an example to this effect, we have one
easily at hand. If Zeb is normally negligent, then his failure to treat his dog’s eye condition
is not abnormal and hence not a cause of the dog’s blindness in one sense, but it is a cause
if we consider a set of moral norms, which prescribe that he ought to have tended to his
dog’s health.
The upshot is that our commonsense judgments about absences as causes can only be
vindicated by a metaphysical theory that relativizes causation to a motley set of norms.
And this, Beebee maintains, is wholly unacceptable. Hence, any metaphysically accept-
able account of absences as causes must revise our commonsense judgments. Either the
relationalists have it an there are no absences as causes, or the non-relationalists have it and
there are far more than commonsense suggests.
2.2.2 A lifeline for the non-relationalist
At this point, we are left to think that both relationalism and non-relationalism fail to re-
spect our commonsense judgments. Commonsense judges that Zeb’s failure to care for
his dog caused the dog’s blindness, but my failure didn’t (after all, I’ve never met Zeb or
his dog). The simple version of non-relationalism endorses just the counterfactual condi-
tion: the absence of an A-type event causes some event b just in case, if an A-type event
had occurred, then b wouldn’t have. And this version runs afoul of commonsense; if the
simple version is correct, then my failure to care for Zeb’s dog also caused the dog’s blind-
ness. Reigning in commonsense by appealing to normative considerations doesn’t help —
so much for respecting commonsense. And this is bad because respecting commonsense
judgments is the primary motivation for the non-relationalist move.
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But non-relationalists need not be content with either the simple or normative version.
A more refined non-relationalist view might do better by commonsense by invoking a sec-
ond, non-normative condition. Beebee introduces a third candidate definition:
(III) The absence of an A-type event caused b if and only if:
(i) if an A-type event had occurred, b would not have occurred; and
(ii) an A-type event occurs at a world that is reasonably close to the actual
world.17
This definition is more metaphysically plausible than the normative version. Consider-
ations about abnormality and epistemic and moral norms do not constitute the truth condi-
tions for causal statements. Rather, reference to abnormality and other norms inform our
judgments about the nearness of worlds.
Beebee offers two objections to this definition. First, reconsider the case of Zeb and his
dog. Commonsense would insist that Zeb’s failure to care for his dog’s health is a cause
of the dog’s blindness, even if Zeb has no disposition to care for his dog. Zeb may exhibit
such a disregard for his dog’s health that it is more likely that an animal control officer
would have removed the dog from Zeb’s care than it would be that Zeb took his dog to
the veterinarian. Thus, the world where an animal control officer intervenes is nearer to the
actual world than the world where Zeb cares for his dog properly. Yet, commonsense is still
disposed to call Zeb’s failure, not the absence of the animal control officer’s intervention,
a cause of the dog’s blindness. Beebee puts this objection thusly, “I take it that common
sense simply doesn’t endorse the view that if you’re negligent enough... your negligence
literally won’t have any effects.”18
17. Beebee, see n. 1: 298.
18. Ibid.: 299.
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Beebee’s second objection bears directly on the adequacy of the (ii) condition. She
argues that there is no plausible metric available to determine the nearness of possible
worlds. While we might be able to judge relative similarity, we are unable to firmly specify
what counts as “reasonably close” to the actual world. What counts as ‘reasonably close’
in some cases will be judged distant in others. Thus, any effort to impose a metric on the
nearness of worlds is bound to be arbitrary.
Beebee claims that these considerations prompt a general problem for any account of
absences as causes. She writes,
There just isn’t any objective feature that some absences have and others lack in
virtue of which some absences are causes and others are not. So any definition
of causation by absence that seeks to provide a principled distinction between
absences that are and are not causes is bound to fail: No such definition will
succeed in carving nature at its joints.19
What drives this assertion is the assumption that absences simply don’t have objective
features. If this assumption is right, then it follows quite easily that there are no objective
features of absences that some have and others lack. A fortiori, such features cannot ground
causal truths concerning absences. Elsewhere in the dissertation, I argue that we ought to
question this assumption. Our commonsense judgments track what people take to be the
causal powers of what are commonly called ‘absences.’ We shouldn’t be overly concerned
with the status of what the metaphysician calls absences — objects or events, which, quite
literally, do not exist. Rather, we should determine whether what we intuitively label ‘ab-
sences’ have any objective features. For the moment, I table this investigation. In Chapter
3, I consider the positive account that Beebee provides to show that relationalism does bet-
ter by commonsense. She argues that intuitive judgments about negative causation really
19. Beebee, see n. 1: 300.
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track judgments about causal explanations. She argues that absences can causally explain,
even though they cannot cause. In the next section, I consider the explanations of error
offered by the non-relationalist.
2.2.3 Explanations of Error
The moral of the previous section is that both relationalism and non- relationalism must re-
ject some evidence afforded by our commonsense judgments. The relationalist must reject
our evidence for negative causation; the non- relationalist must reject our evidence against
certain spurious cases of negative causation. Sarah McGrath has recently put the problem
in terms of a dilemma: “Either there is no causation by omission, or there is far more than
common sense says there is.”20 Relationalism suffers the first horn and non-relationalism
the second. Beebee claims that this is just so much the worse for commonsense, but both
the relationalist and the non-relationalist owe some explanation for the errors each attribute
to commonsense. After all, if we are going to leave a significant body of evidence out of
our analysis, we need some reason for leaving it out. To do otherwise is ad hoc. In this
chapter, I deal primarily with the explanations of error offered in favor of non-relationalism.
In Chapters 3 and 4, I address explanations of error offered by relationalists.
The problem for non-relationalists is that they are forced to recognize far more neg-
ative causation than commonsense is inclined to accept. For example, if I fail to water
my houseplant and it dies, commonsense judges that my failure caused the death. How-
ever, commonsense would deny that President Obama’s failure to water the houseplant also
caused its death. Following Jonathan Bennett, David Lewis asserts that President Obama’s
20. McGrath, “Causation By Omission: A Dilemma,” see n. 10.
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failure to water the houseplant caused its death is infelicitous to utter, but it is a true asser-
tion nonetheless.21
For Bennett in particular, the infelicity is due to considerations of salience. Facts about
Obama’s failure to water the plant aren’t salient in the context of our current example. In
similar fashion, Lewis adds that many true propositions are inappropriate to assert if they
are irrelevant, known to all concerned, etc.22 On the Lewis-Bennett approach, the differ-
ence between my and President Obama’s causal influence on the death of the houseplant is
pragmatic, not metaphysical.
The appeal of this approach for explaining commonsense error is that it is purportedly
consistent with general pragmatic considerations. Even in uncontroversial cases of posi-
tive causation, we frequently refrain from citing certain causes. If an unattended cigarette
causes a house-fire, we don’t bother to mention the oxygen in the air, even though the
presence of oxygen is certainly a cause of the fire. Furthermore, it seems that the case of
causation doesn’t require anything special in addition to standard Gricean pragmatics.
In his defense of the causal theory of perception, Grice explains why it is often inap-
propriate to utter something true:
When someone makes such a remark as “It looks red to me” a certain implica-
tion is carried, an implication which is disjunctive in form. It is implied either
that the object referred to is known or believed by the speaker not to be red, or
that it has been denied by someone else to be red, or that the speaker is doubt-
ful whether it is red... [T]here would be something at least prima facie odd
about my saying “That looks red to me” (not as a joke) when I am confronted
by a British pillar box in normal daylight at a range of a few feet.23
21. Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself (New York: Clarendon Press, 1995); Lewis,
“Causation as Influence,” see n. 1.
22. Lewis, “Causation as Influence,” see n. 1: 196.
23. Grice, see n. 7: 124.
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Of course, the British pillar box does look red. But given that it is red and everyone expects
it to be red, it would be conversationally inappropriate to say that it looks red. However,
Sarah McGrath has argued — quite rightly — that the non-relationalist and Grice need to
explain different things:
So the datum Grice seeks to explain is that we do not utter certain truths, not
that we do utter certain falsehoods, and he is right about the datum.24
The non-relationalist’s burden is not to explain why we refrain from uttering certain
truths. The problem is that we do utter certain falsehoods. We certainly do refrain from
saying that Obama’s failure to water the plant caused its death, but, more importantly,
we deny that his failure is a cause. The non-relationalist cannot merely apply Grice’s
pragmatic account to the spurious cases of negative causation. Rather, the non-relationalist
needs to explain why we say false things, not why we merely refrain from saying true
things. The latter is easy, and the former is never undertaken.
2.3 Conclusion
Nothing in the forgoing chapter fully refutes non-relationalism. Rather, I have clarified
the prima facie case for relationalism. We most naturally regard causation as a relation,
and the specific causal verbs are clearly relational. Given this, it would be quite odd if
there causation managed not to relate entities whenever the need arises. How strange that
causation relates entities except when there are no entities to relate!
I have also outlined the basic case against non-relationalism. Non-relationalism cre-
ates as many problems as it handles. If we take seriously our commonsense evidence that
24. McGrath, “Causation By Omission: A Dilemma,” see n. 10: 132.
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absences often cause and are often caused, then we should also take seriously our com-
monsense evidence that Obama’s failure to water my houseplant did not cause it to die.
Removing the requirement that causation must relate entities also removes limits on what
counts as causation. The non-relationalist suffers an explosion of causes. Lewis recognizes
this explosion; he also recognizes that we should be able to explain why we don’t recog-
nize spurious instances of causation. We do not count Obama’s failure as a cause of my
houseplant’s death. But the explanation at hand — pragmatics — is ill-suited for this task.
The explosion is left without an adequate explanation.
All this serves to motivate the account that I develop in subsequent chapters. The in-
consistency of relationalism and genuinism, I will argue, is merely apparent. Thus, the
rejection of negative causation by relationalists is unnecessary, and the rejection of the re-
lational nature of causation by non-relationalists is a solution in need of a problem. We can
have our cake and eat it too: causation relates entities and negative causal statements can
be true and express genuine causal relations.
33
Chapter 3
No Negative Causal Explanation Without Negative
Causation 1
At this stage, it should be clear that the standard relationalist accounts must attribute
widespread error to commonsense. But so must the standard non-relationalist accounts.
Either there is no negative causation, or there is a lot of it. A whole lot of it, perhaps an infi-
nite supply. So commonsense either errs in judging that there is some negative causation, or
commonsense errs in judging that there is a limit to it. On both sides of the divide, we are
owed some explanation for our error. In virtue of what does commonsense get causation so
wrong when it comes to absences?
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that the explanations of error by the non-
relationalist are wanting. The non-relationalist appeals to pragmatics won’t do. Even if
pragmatics can be employed to explain why we refrain from uttering certain truths, it is not
clear that pragmatics can equally explain why we do utter falsehoods. Thus, if it is true
that Obama’s failure to water my houseplant caused it to die, we have no explanation for
our emphatic denial of that truth. At least, that explanation won’t come from the domain
of pragmatics.
1. Portions of Chapter 3 were presented at the 2010 Pacific Division Meeting of the
American Philosophical Association.
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Perhaps a relationalist explanation of error will fare better. According to relationalism,
it is false that Obama’s failure to water the houseplant caused it to die. But it is also false
that my failure to water it caused it to die. The relationalist also must explain this error,
after all, we readily affirm that my failure is a cause of the houseplant’s death.
Helen Beebee and Achille Varzi have recently argued that commonsense is insensitive
to the distinction between causation and causal explanation. For cases of positive causa-
tion, causal claims and causal explanations coincide, hence the insensitivity does not result
in mistaken causal judgments. But in putative cases of negative causation, there is no coin-
cidence: Absences can casually explain events, but cannot cause or be caused. Therefore,
commonsense errs with regard to negative causation alone.
The Beebee-Varzi approach is attractive, since it preserves the relational view of cau-
sation, yet explains why commonsense is prone to systematic error. However, I argue that
the approach fails, but in instructive ways. In this paper, I argue that absences cannot figure
into causal explanations, unless absences specify causes, if only generally. But, if absences
specify causes, then negative causal claims can be true. And this, I maintain, is enough
to vindicate our commonsense judgments about negative causation. Thus, negative causa-
tion does not pose a special problem for our account of causation. The problem is merely
apparent.
3.1 Absences and Causal Explanations
Recall from the previous chapter that, as Beebee sets up the problem, any metaphysically
plausible account of causation must reject some class of our commonsense judgments.
The relationalist must reject all negative causal judgments, and the non-relationalist must
accept far more negative causation that commonsense recognizes. In either case, we have
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a tendency to assert falsehoods, and this tendency deserves explanation. Returning to the
fire example, the relationalist should explain why we assert that Jones is a cause of the fire
when he isn’t, and the non-relationalist should explain why we assert that Brown isn’t a
cause of the fire when he is.
Having rejected the pragmatic explanation of the non-relationalist, I now consider Bee-
bee’s explanation. She argues that our tendency to affirm false negative causal judgments
issues from a confusion. The idea is that causal claims normally coincide with causal expla-
nations for uncontroversial cases of positive causation. For example, if a cigarette causes a
house-fire, it is also true that the house-fire occurred because of the cigarette. Coincidence
of causal claims and causal explanations is so ubiquitous, Beebee claims, that we typically
fail to notice the difference and move readily from one to the other:
I say that common sense is just mistaken when it asserts that an absence or
an omission caused some event. It’s not an especially bad mistake. Often
we move between the “E because C” and “c caused e” locution without going
wrong: It doesn’t much matter whether I say “the match lit because I struck
it” or instead “my striking the match caused it to light...” Often causal expla-
nations go hand in hand with causal relations between events. Often but not
always.2
If Beebee is right, then when we assert a negative causal claim it is always false, yet it
is unsurprising that we assert it. In order for this explanation of commonsense mistakes
to succeed, Beebee must: a) Give reason to think that we actually confuse causation with
causal explanation; b) Establish a distinction between causation and causal explanation;
and, c) Demonstrate that causally inert ‘absences’ can causally explain.
Beebee starts with Davidson’s distinction between causation and causal explanation.
On Davidson’s view, causation is a relation among events, and so absences are not the
2. Beebee, see n. 1: 305.
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sorts of things which can enter (since they are not things at all). However, as Davidson
claims, “Explanations typically relate statements, not events.”3 This opens the door for
the possibility that absences, which are not causally efficacious, are causally explanatory.
The idea is that while absences cannot cause things to happen, they can often explain why
things happen. Whereas causation is a relation among entities, explanations are relations
among statements, and statements about absences are well-suited for this.
This is important for Beebee’s account, since it gives the relationalist something to say
out our commonsense judgments that absences are sometimes causes. Intuitively plausible
statements of the form, “The absence of x caused y” are always false, but there is a nearby
explanatory statement that is true, ‘Y because there is no X” Even though Jones’s failure to
close the fire door is not a cause of the fire, his negligence may causally explain the fire.
For this approach to work, Beebee must show that causally inert absences can figure into
true causal explanations.
To show this, Beebee endorses David Lewis account of causal explanation. Lewis’s
central thesis is that, “to explain an event is to provide some information about its causal
history.”4 According to Lewis, one way to provide information about some event’s causal
history is to cite its particular causes. But this is not the only way. An explanation may
only cite an existential statement. For instance, we might explain a murder by saying that
someone shot the victim. On the face of it, this does not specify a cause of the murder, but
it tells us something about the causal history of the murder, namely that it was caused by a
shooter. There is a wide range of of information about the causal history of an event that
3. Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001): 159–160.
4. David Lewis, Philosophical Papers: Volume II (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1986): 217.
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can causally explain, including negative information. We might further provide information
about the causal history of the murder by saying that Jones wasn’t the shooter.5
But just what causal information do absences provide? Following Lewis, Beebee claims
that absences provide a minimal kind of causal information, they tell us what isn’t in the
causal history of the explanandum. Additionally, talk of absences provides a kind of modal
information. They tell us how the causal trajectory would have gone had the absence oc-
curred. And this, she claims is causal information. So absences causally explain without
being causes.
If Beebe is correct about this much, then absences can explain without being causes.
Beebee must further show that commonsense confuses negative causal claims with negative
causal explanations. She claims that the confusion has its source in the way we talk about
absences. We very often speak of absences as if they are things — events or objects. We
often talk of the void — as Beebee points out in reference to Lewis’s “Void and Object”
— as if it is an entity. However, there is no object in the world picked out by the locution.
The void is nothing at all. Locutions such as this — we could include talk of the void
or of negligence — engender confusion. As Beebee notes, “Absences, omissions, and
failures get assimilated to the familiar ontological category of events even though they are
not events.”6 This ontological assimilation underlies the confusion between causation and
causal explanation. Normally, causal explanation refers to events in the causal etiology of
the explanandum, and so the causal explanation involves causal claims. Since we often talk
about absences as if they were events, we mistakenly conflate causal explanations involving
absences with causal statements involving absences. This is unproblematic with positive
5. Lewis, Philosophical Papers: Volume II, see n. 4: 219—220.
6. Beebee, see n. 1: 304.
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causation and corresponding causal explanations. But when we do it with absences, it
generates a mistake. But, she thinks, the mistake is innocuous enough. For metaphysics
part, however, we should not take our tendency to treat absences as causes as evidence that
they are causes.
With these basics in place, we can reconstruct Beebee’s central argument:
Absences are neither causes nor effects, thus negative causal statements are
false. However, citing an absence can causally explain an event without spec-
ifying any causes of that event. Therefore, there are true negative causal ex-
planations that do not coincide with true negative causal statements. Common-
sense is insensitive to the distinction between causation and causal explanation.
Therefore, commonsense mistakenly judges that some absence A causes event
E when citing A causally explains the occurrence of E.
In the next section, I refute two of Beebee’s crucial premises. First, empirical evidence
undermines the claim that commonsense is insensitive to the distinction between causa-
tion and causal explanation. A recent study suggests that commonsense is sensitive to the
distinction between causation and causal explanation. Thus, Beebee’s explanation of our
tendency to affirm false negative causal judgments fails. We can tell the difference between
causation and causal explanation. Since we don’t fail to draw the distinction, supposing
that we do doesn’t explain anything.
Next, and perhaps more critical, I argue that citing an absence can causally explain
an event without specifying any causes of that event. Causal explanations must specify
causes, if only generally. An account of causal explanation that weakens this requirement
succumbs to counterexamples. Furthermore, in prevention cases, absences must specify
causes, or else there is nothing to explain. In what follows, I refute Beebee’s empirical
claim, then I address the account of causal explanation she adopts to show that causal
explanations require the specification of causes and effects.
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3.2 Absences and Causal Explanations Revisited
3.2.1 Empirical Considerations
In a recent study, Jonathan Livengood and Edouard Machery test the following prediction,
following Beebee’s hypothesis that the folk fail to discriminate between causal explanation
and causation:
People should agree equally with sentences asserting that an event e took place
because an absence a obtained and with sentences asserting that the absence a
caused the event e, when a is a relevant absence in the causal history of e.7
The goal is to empirically test Beebee’s claim that people fail to notice the distinction
between causal claims and causal explanations. Recall that this claim is crucial to the
success of Beebee’s proposal. Confusing causation with causal explanation is supposed to
explain why people make false causal claims. If people successfully discriminate between
causation and causal explanation, then Beebee’s proposal is undermined.
Livengood and Machery developed three cases to test the above prediction. These tests
are listed below as they are presented in (Livengood and Machery, “The Folk Probably
Don’t Think What You Think They Think: Experiments on Causation by Absence.”):
Experiment 1: The Rope Case
“Susan had to climb a rope in gym class. Susan was a very good climber, and
she climbed all the way to the rafters.”
Experiment 2: The Broken Rope Case
“Susan had to climb a rope in gym class. Susan was a very good climber. She
started climbing, but the rope broke before she reached the rafters. She fell on
the ground.”
Experiment 3: The Unsafe Rope Case
7. Jonathan Livengood and Edouard Machery, “The Folk Probably Don’t Think What
You Think They Think: Experiments on Causation by Absence.,” Midwest Studies In Phi-
losophy 31, no. 1 (2007): 115.
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“Susan had to climb an old, worn-out rope in gym class. She wondered if it
would support her weight. Susan was a very good climber. Though nervous,
she climbed all the way to the rafters.”
In each experiment, individuals were randomly assigned to either the causal condition
or the explanation condition and presented with the description of the relevant experiment
given above. Those in the explanation condition group were given a causal statement rele-
vant to the particular experiment. Those in the causal condition group were given a causal
statement. Each individual was then asked to assess, on a scale from 1 to 7 how much they
agreed or disagreed with a given statement (1 indicating total disagreement and 7 indicating
total agreement)
Experiment 1 straightforwardly tests the prediction. For the explanation condition, in-
dividuals were asked to rate their level of agreement their response with the following
statement: ‘Susan reached the rafters because the rope did not break.’ For the causation
condition, individuals were asked to rank, on the same scale, their response to the follow-
ing statement: ‘The rope not breaking caused Susan to reach the rafters.’
The results of experiment 1 suggest that subjects did not consider the rope’s not break-
ing a cause of Susan’s reaching the rafters. (The mean response to the causal condition was
2.73.) Furthermore, subjects were only slightly more inclined to agree with the statement
in the explanation condition. (The mean answer to the explanation condition was 3.5.) In
this case, the absence of the rope breaking was not judged a cause or a causal explanation
of Susan reaching the rafters.
The results of experiment 2 indicate that subjects were just as likely to agree with the
causal question as the explanatory condition. Both groups judged that the rope breaking
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both caused and causally explained Sue falling to the ground. (The mean answer for the
causal condition was 5.77; the mean answer to the explanatory condition was 5.47.)
Finally, we might think that the results of experiment 1 can be accounted for because
in the Rope Case, there is no reason to think that the rope might break. Thus, the absence
— the rope not breaking — is not salient. This may explain the tendency to disagree with
both the causal and the explanation condition. To test for this possibility, Livengood and
Machery ran experiment 3, where the possibility of the rope breaking is made explicit.
In experiment 3, which was modeled after experiments 1 and 2, subjects in the explana-
tion group were given the following statement: ‘Susan reached the rafter because the rope
did not break.’ The subjects in the causation group were given this statement: ‘The rope
not breaking caused Susan to reach the rafters.’ The results of experiment 3 indicated that
subjects more likely to agree with the explanation question than the causation condition.
(The mean answer for the causal condition was 3.06; the mean answer to the explanatory
condition was 4.00.) Here it is suggested that subjects are not inclined to judge that the
rope not breaking is either a cause of or a causal explanation for Sue reaching the rafters.
The combined results of these experiments suggest that subjects successfully make the
distinction between causation and explanation. Subjects were more prone to agree with the
explanation question than the causation question in both experiments 1 and 3, suggesting
that the two are not commonly conflated. This is trouble for Beebee’s proposal. Early on,
she writes, “I claim that commonsense judges some absences to be causes because it fails
to distinguish between causation and causal explanation.” Later, she claims that “Like the
distinction between events and absences, the distinction between a true explanation — a
true ‘because’ statement — and an adequate explanation is one that common sense has a
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tendency to ignore.”8 Unfortunately, we have evidence that commonsense is sensitive to
the distinction.
The study has another, more unexpected result. As Livengood and Machery note, it also
suggests that people are not obviously inclined to consider absences to be either causes or
explanatorily relevant. The favorable response to the causal condition for experiment 1 and
3 was quite weak, suggesting that the intuition that absences are causes is not as widespread
as philosophers assume. Furthermore, the responses to the explanatory condition for ex-
periments 1 and 3 were only slightly higher than the respective responses to the causal
condition. All in all, the responses to both the explanatory and causal conditions were
middling.
What should we make of this result? It might be tempting to say that the findings
suggest that the debate about absences as causes is under-motivated. If the folk don’t
readily assert that absences are sometimes causes, then we needn’t worry about preserving
the possibility. This would be, of course, good news for the relationalist: There is no data
in need of explanation. But dismissing the problem in this way is too quick. No doubt, in
experiment 1, subjects were not inclined to regard the rope not breaking a cause. But once
the possibility of the rope breaking was made salient, the inclination to judge the rope not
breaking a cause increased. If there was no problem, we shouldn’t expect to see any change.
More empirical research is required to discover just how far this goes. If Livengood and
Machery’s experiment was such that the rope was on its last thread, we might see an even
greater tendency to judge that it not breaking is a cause of Susan reaching the rafters. At
this stage we cannot reject this possibility, and the data does suggest that the tendency to
judge an absence a cause increases with the increase of the absence’s salience.
8. Beebee, see n. 1: 293, 307.
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Fortunately, intuitions about unbroken ropes notwithstanding, we don’t need to look
very far to find absences that are readily considered causes. A quick search of MEDLINE
reveals that neglect — a caretaker not doing something — is accounted a primary cause
of a variety of events. For instance, neglect is often cited as a primary cause of suicidal
behavior. Brodsky and Stanley (2008) note that,
Childhood abuse and neglect are among the many etiologic factors in the de-
velopment of suicidal behavior. Childhood abuse and neglect are more likely
to occur in families characterized by a range of adversities that might also
contribute to the development of psychopathology, such as familial conflict,
parental psychopathology, and suicide attempts in abusing parents. There is
strong evidence for a robust relationship between childhood abuse/neglect and
suicide, even when controlling for other environmental variables.9
Here Brodsky and Stanley place neglect squarely within the causal history of suici-
dal behavior. This is important if we are to shake the feeling that negative causation is
a chimera. The results of Livengood and Machery’s study might lead us to believe that
people don’t think that absences are causes. After all, the favorable responses to the causal
condition for both experiment 1 and 3 were quite weak. However, the above passage from
Brodsky and Stanley show that clinicians and scientists are inclined to regard absences as
causal. Even if people don’t think that a rope not breaking is ever a cause, people do think
that neglect is. We should not be tempted to dismiss the problem of negative causation on
the basis of Livengood and Machery’s study alone.
3.2.2 No causal explanation without causation
For cases of neglect, Beebee and like-minded theorists would have it that parental neglect
does not cause, but merely explains, suicidal behaviors. The folk, scientists, and clinicians
9. B.S. Brodsky and B. Stanley, “Adverse Childhood Experiences and Suicidal Be-
havior,” The Psychiatric Clinics of North America 31, no. 2 (2008): pg. 223.
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just mistake neglect for a cause. The reason for this mistake is the confusion of causation
and causal explanation. Livengood and Machery have given us reasons to doubt that such
confusion exists, but the results of their study are not conclusive.
Here I leave the status of Beebee’s empirical premise an open question. More central
to our present concern is Beebee’s claim that absences can causally explain without be-
ing causes. I argue that Lewis’s account of causal explanation, which Beebee utilizes for
this purpose, is inadequate unless absences specify causes. Of course, if absences specify
causes, then negative causation is genuine causation.
On Lewis’s account, a causal explanation only needs to provide some information about
the causal history of an event. This information can be very specific or very general. Lewis
openly admits that his account of causal explanation is permissive. For example, a doctor
could very well explain the sedative effect of an opiate by claiming that the opiate has a
‘dormative virtue.’ It may not be much of an explanation, but it at least tells us something
about the causal history that leads to the sedative effect: we know that the marketer of the
opiate didn’t sneak in and administer some other depressant so that the opiate looks like it
has a sedative effect.10
The permissibility of Lewis’s account might be enough to cause many philosophers to
reject it. But I argue that even if we are willing to accept its admitted permissibility, further
analysis reveals that it is even much more permissive than Lewis thinks. If we accept
Lewis account of causal explanation, then nearly anything can provide information about
the causal history of nearly any event.
This result is deeply problematic for Lewis’s account because his is supposed to be bet-
ter than the deductive-nomological (D-N) model of explanation. That is, there are standard
10. Lewis, Philosophical Papers: Volume II, see n. 4: 221.
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examples that, according to the D-N model, count as explanations, but aren’t. If Lewis ac-
count is to succeed, then it had better give the right verdict with regard to those examples.
If Lewis’s account fails to do so, then it is not an adequate account of causal explanation.
I argue that Lewis’s account of causal explanation falls to the very same counterexamples
that fell the D-N model.
According to the D-N model of explanation, an explanation is an argument that has as
its premises at least one law-like sentence and other sentences specifying the prior con-
ditions such that the premises entail the explanandum. The counterexamples to D-N are
well-known, and Lewis notes versions of each of the following and a few others:
1. A building casts a shadow. Laws about the linear propagation of light and facts about
the length of the shadow entail the height of the building. But the length of the
shadow doesn’t explain the height of the building.
2. Laws of atmospheric pressure and relevant facts about the reading on a barometer
entail facts about particular weather events. But the reading on a barometer doesn’t
explain the weather.
I have chosen to focus on these two counterexamples because they share a certain fea-
ture. We think these are not explanations — even though we can construct perfectly good
D-N arguments for each — because they flaunt the asymmetry of causation. The length of
a flagpole’s shadow can’t explain the height of the flagpole because shadows don’t cause
flagpoles. So too with barometric readings; they don’t cause barometric events. Both ex-
amples have the causal sequence backwards.
Lewis addresses these examples because he needs to show that in cases where D-N ar-
guments appear to be explanatory they provide causal information, and in cases where D-N
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arguments do not appear explanatory they do not provide causal information. Causal infor-
mation, Lewis thinks, makes the difference between an explanation and a non-explanation.
However, I argue that our counterexamples do provide some causal information in Lewis’s
sense, yet they are not explanatory. Thus, providing mere causal information is not good
enough for an explanation.
My objection takes its start from a complaint Elliot Sober had against accounts of causal
explanation like Lewis’s.11 As he points out,
When a building casts a shadow, the sun’s position and the shadow’s length
do not explain the building’s height because, it would seem, they do not cause
it...The pseudo-explanation mentioned before of the building’s height does tell
us something about the cause — namely that it produced a building that al-
lowed the sun to cast the length shadow it did.12
Lewis admits that causal information may be merely existential in character. We might
explain an event by stating that it was caused by an event of such-and-such kind. This
is precisely what we have in the flagpole example. The cause of the building was the
kind of cause which enabled the building produce the shadow that it did. Unfortunately,
pseudo-explanations like the flagpole example are precisely the ones that Lewis’s account
is supposed to rule out.
We can easily extend Sober’s complaint to the barometer case. The reading on the
barometer gives us causal information about the cause of a weather event. It tells us that
the cause of the weather event also affects the barometer. That is, we are told that the
weather event has a particular kind of cause — the kind of cause which affects barometers.
11. Sober’s article predates Lewis’s. However, his comments anticipate Lewis and
provide a framework for criticizing his account of causal explanation.
12. Elliott Sober, “Equilibrium Explanation,” Philosophical Studies 43 (1983): 201–
203.
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Each of our D-N counterexamples turn out to be explanations on Lewis’s account. Thus,
they are counterexamples to Lewis’s account if they are counterexamples to the D-N model.
The problem generalizes. Citing a common cause explains an event since it delivers infor-
mation about the event’s causal history. It tells us that the event’s cause is of a certain
kind, the kind that has some other mentioned effect. Worse yet, it turns out that Lewis
must accept a kind of self-explanation. The fact that the salt dissolves tells us that the salt
dissolving has a particular kind of cause — the kind that causes salt to dissolve.
The problem is that information is cheap; useful information is premium. Lewis does
take pains to note that not all causal explanations are as good as any other. Perhaps Lewis’s
account is on better footing than the D-N account because he can say that while the length
of the shadow is an explanation of the building’s height, it isn’t a very good explanation.
This response isn’t available on the D-N model. There are only explanations and non-
explanations, not good explanations and bad explanations. Nevertheless, Lewis’s view
commits him to thinking that nearly all information is explanatory in some manner or other,
even information about explanandum itself. Lewis’s only recourse is to claim that such ex-
planations are bad explanations. As Lewis notes, the quality of an explanation depends on a
variety of pragmatic factors. For example, an explanation may not provide useful informa-
tion by providing too little, too much, or irrelevant information.13 Lewis might comfortably
admit that the counterexamples to D-N are explanations, just very bad explanations. The
same would then be said of self-explanation.
However, to take this route is to reduce Lewis’s account to a pragmatic account. The
merits of pragmatic accounts aside, to call Lewis’s account a causal account of explanation
is a misnomer. The notion of ‘causal information’ is not doing any of the heavy lifting.
13. Lewis, Philosophical Papers: Volume II, see n. 4: 226-228.
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Hard-nosed bullet biting won’t do; such an account is not a satisfactory account of causal
explanation. Lewis’s account does not suffice for Beebee’s purposes; she requires an ac-
count of causal explanation such that absences can explain without being causes. But the
account she utilizes to satisfy this requirement is inadequate. Mere information about an
event’s causal history won’t do — causal explanation requires more. It is difficult to see
how more could be provided without requiring that the causal information specify causes
of the event. In this case, absences couldn’t causally explain without specifying causes.
Perhaps a satisfactory account of causal explanation that fits the bill could be found, even if
it is not Lewis’s. However, in the next subsection, I argue that even if absences can causally
explain without being causes and people do systematically confuse causation with causal
explanation, Beebee is still unable to accommodate many of our intuitive judgments, those
where we judge an absence to be an effect.
3.2.3 Preventions: Nothing to Explain
Assume for the moment that commonsense fails to distinguish between causation and
causal explanation. Assume further that citing absences can causally explain events with-
out absences being causes. Even this level of success cannot adequately explain away our
commonsense judgments about the causal role of absences. Consider a modified version
of our earlier example where Jones does close the fire door. His action would prevent the
fire — and we would say that there was no fire because Jones closed the fire door. Com-
monsense would likely judge that Jones closing the fire door caused there to be no fire. Or,
more naturally, Jones’s action prevented the fire. 14 But consider our explanatory claim
14. If your intuitions differ, consider the case where Jones’s action contains the fire,
thereby causing everyone in the building to evacuate safely. We do judge that Jones’s action
caused the safe evacuation, and it only does so in virtue of preventing the fire.
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more carefully. Jones’s action explains the absence of fire, and if Beebee is right, that is no
event at all.
We should agree that Jones action explains the absence of the fire. But, just as relations
need relata, explanations need explananda. But what is our explanandum in the modified
Jones example? To find the explanandum would be to find an event that the his closing
the fire door explains. The obvious answer cannot be right — the absence of fire. By
assumption, this is not an event, and so it can not serve as our explanandum. For Lewis-
style causal explanations, we need an event about which to provide information. Thus,
an appeal to causal explanation does not explain our intuitive judgments about cases of
prevention.
This failure is deeply problematic. The appeal to causal explanation is designed to
mitigate the counterintuitive results of denying the causal role of absences. Though our
commonsense judgments about the causal power of absences are false, they are not far
off the mark. For our false but plausible commonsense judgments about causation and
absences, there are true causal explanations near by. But there is no such causal explanation
near to our judgments about cases of prevention; there is no event to explain.
In a recent paper, Achille Varzi has built on Beebee’s proposal and addressed the is-
sue of preventions. He claims just what I deny, that we can account for commonsense
judgments about prevention cases by appeal to causal explanation. Consider Varzi’s exam-
ple: “Johnny didn’t turn off the gas because he got absorbed in his book.” Varzi admits
that an explanatory claim like this does not provide a causal explanation of what happened
— Johnny not turning of the gas is not a happening. Varzi claims that the information is
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about the causal consequences of what Johnny does, that those consequences do not include
Johnny turning off the gas.15
Varzi recognizes that for causal explanations we require events for explananda. When
no events are readily available to fill that role we can find them — we allow that negative
descriptions pick out events, if only generally.
I think that if this strategy works for missing events with regard to explanations, then
it works for missing events with regard to causal statements. This insight motivates my
positive proposal that I preview in the next section (and fully developed in Chapter 5). I
distinguish between causal statements and the actual causes (events) that those statements
pick out. Thus, we have relational negative causation in cases where negative causal state-
ments have as their truthmakers the relevant entities which enter into causal relations. We
can maintain the relationalist model of causation without holding that all negative causal
claims are false. How?
The rough idea is that the negative description, “Johnny didn’t turn off the gas,” speci-
fies the explanandum. In this case, the explananda are the events that result from Johnny’s
reading a book. The upshot is that to provide an explanandum for Lewis-style causal ex-
planations, Varzi allows negative descriptions to specify events or sets of events.
What Varzi says about cases of prevention by omission — negative cause and negative
effect — makes the point more clearly. For cases of prevention, the explanandum is a set
of events, generally specified. Consider another of Varzi’s examples: “Johnny didn’t turn
of the gas because he forgot.” With regard to this, Varzi writes,
My answer is that we are in fact referring to a certain course of events, though
very generally: we are referring to what happened at Johnny’s house during
the period of time specified [in] the context of our narrative, and we are saying
15. Varzi, see n. 4.
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that this course of events doesn’t include any episode of a certain type A — any
event of Johnny’s turning off the gas — because it doesn’t include any episode
of a certain type B — any event of Johnny’s remembering to do so.16
If Varzi is right, then the explanandum in our prevention example is the set of events
which doesn’t include Johnny turning off the gas. In the prevention by omission example,
the explanans is information about what is not in the causal history of the set of events
which doesn’t include Johnny turning of the gas.
Varzi recognizes that for causal explanations we require events for explananda. When
no events are readily available to fill that role we can find them — we allow negative de-
scriptions to specify events. I argue that if this strategy works for missing events with
regard to explanations, then it works for missing events with regard to causal statements.
This insight motivates the positive proposal I develop in the remainder of this dissertation.
I distinguish between causal statements and the actual causes (events) that those state-
ments specify. On my view, we have relational negative causation in cases where negative
causal statements have as their truthmakers the relevant entities which enter into causal
relations. We can maintain the relationalist model of causation without holding that all
negative causal claims are false.
3.3 Relational Negative Causation
I reserve a full development of my account of relational negative causation for later chap-
ters. Here I mean only to sketch the basic strategy for how we should think about ab-
sences within a relational causal framework in light of my criticism of the Beebee-Varzi
approach. We should begin by carefully distinguishing between causal statements and the
16. Varzi, see n. 4: 8.
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actual causal relata. It is natural to think that a causal statement is true only if it directly
specifies the causal relata. And this is what putative causal statements involving absences
fail to do. Consider our paradigm omission case: “The failure to water the plant caused it
to die.” The trouble is that such a statement fails to directly specify the causal relata; there
is no event consisting of ‘the failure to water the plant.’ The designated waterer may be off
playing a game, or there may be no waterer at all. As such there is no event to bear a causal
relation to the death of the plant, a metaphysically respectable, if unfortunate, event.
Once we accept the relationalist framework and admit that there is no event ‘not being
watered,’ must we accept that the putative causal statement is false? We need not. While
there is no entity — event, state of affairs, etc. — of ‘not being watering’ — there is an
entity which serves as the truthmaker for the statement that the plant is not watered. And
this entity is the cause of the plant’s death. If we speak of events, there is an actual event,
the causal relata, which essentially consists of “not being watered” that caused the plant
to die. That event, its effect, and the causal relation are the truthmakers for the causal
statement, “The absence of water caused to plant to die.”
We revise our earlier suggestion. A true causal statement need not directly specify the
causal relata; a true causal statement must have as its truthmaker the actual causal relata
and the causal relation. In this way, negative descriptions specify causes, if only generally.
Return to our plant example, an absence of water caused the plant to die. Consider only the
simple proposition, that there is an absence of water. This proposition has as it truthmaker
some actual event — either the particular dry state of the soil in the plant’s environment
or the particular osmotic pressure of the plant’s cells — that bears a causal relation to the
state of the plant at the time of its death. The plant and its soil being the way that it was
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caused the plant to die. In the current example, the negative description, the absence of
water, picks out the actual state of the plant and its environment.
The crucial move is to distinguish between causal statements and the actual causes and
effects. The idea is that we can pick out a cause in a variety of ways and to varying degrees
of specificity, in this case, by citing an absence. The strategy I advocate requires only that
an actual event serves as the truthmaker for a negative proposition.
To illustrate the above strategy, consider an example given by Judith Jarvis Thomson
in a recent article. Consider the presence of Jane at a party. What is Jane’s presence? It
certainly isn’t Jane. Rather, her presence is the state of affairs which consists in Jane’s
being at the party. We can also consider the absence of John at the party. What is John’s
absence? Why, it is the state of affairs that consists in John’s not being at the party.17 The
moral of the story is that there is only one party. And this particular arrangement of states
of affairs — the party — can have effects. John’s absence could upset Jane. Fortunately, we
need not postulate some non-entity, non-John, to make sense of this causal claim. Thomson
talks of ‘states of affairs,’ but we could just as easily talk in terms of ‘events.’ The idea is
just that John’s absence is not some sort of spooky negative event, rather John’s absence
consists in the very events of the party.
Varzi accepts an account like mine for a variety of cases. He writes,
Events are spatio-temporal particulars, so we can describe an event in many
ways, just as we can describe an object in many ways, and depending on the
context we may sometime be inclined to rely on negative rather than positive
descriptions; yet a negative description need not correspond to a negative en-
tity.18
17. Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Causation: Omissions,” Philosophy and Phenomenolog-
ical Research 66 (2003): 81–103.
18. Varzi, see n. 4: 1–2.
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This is amenable to my proposal. We can pick out events in a variety of ways, and there are
many reasons why we might choose a negative description. As Varzi rightly notes, causal
statements are semantically transparent: “[A]ll that matters is the truth of our statement.”19
Varzi’s view of negative causation is more ecumenical than Beebee’s, but I argue that it
does not go far enough. For cases like those mentioned in his earlier examples, Varzi does
not think that this approach applies. He argues that there is no positive event picked out by
‘Johnny’s failure to turn off the gas’ which caused the explosion. Perhaps, as in the earlier
example, Johnny was reading a book. Johnny reading a book did not, Varzi insists, cause
the explosion. Varzi claims that it is for cases like this that we should appeal to Beebee’s
proposal. Johnny’s failure to turn off the gas doesn’t cause the explosion, but it explains it.
I think that Johnny reading a book is a cause the explosion. Admittedly, this does sound
counterintuitive, but only if we fail to attend to the distinction between causal statements
and the causal relata, the entities which cause and get caused. To make the point, we
can follow Varzi’s own analysis when he identified the explanandum in the prevention by
omission case. There, the events being explained by the claim, ‘Johnny didn’t turn off the
gas because he forgot’ is a set of events, selected by the context in which the claim is being
made. If this is good enough to specify events for explanations, I see no reason why it is
not good enough to specify events for causal relations. Whatever was going on in Johnny’s
house while he was reading his book caused the explosion, and we pick-out those events
with the negative description, ‘Johnny’s failure to turn of the gas.’ Those events, the causes
of the explosion, are the truthmakers for that negative description.
My view is that we can specify causal relata with negative descriptions, and that this is
sufficient for the truth of negative causal statements. However, my proposal seems to face
19. Varzi, see n. 4: 2.
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the same problem that faced the non-relationalist. Once we admit that Johnny’s failure to
turn off the gas it seems that we must also accept that Sue’s failure to turn off the gas is
also a cause, even if Sue is no where around Johnny’s house. However, on the view I have
sketched, this problem is more apparent than real. ‘Sue’s failure to turn off the gas’ is a
possible negative description we can give to the events that occurred in Johnny’s house that
caused the explosion. But the events that a negative description specifies is determined by
contextual features.20 Only in a strange context does the negative description “Sue’s failure
to turn off the gas” pick-out the events which caused the explosion when Sue is no where
around. Fortunately, this isn’t a description that anyone is likely to give; Sue can rest easy.
On my approach to relational negative causation, we multiply descriptions, not causes, and
it is no surprise that descriptions are so readily multiplied.
20. This requires a significant contextual assumption. In Chapter 6, I note two cat-
egories of negative causation: those that require the assumption and those that do not.
Generally, cases involving an agent’s failure to act that require the assumption. Thus ‘The
gas not being off caused the explosion’ does not require any contextualist assumption, but
‘Johnny’s failure to turn off the gas caused the explosion’ does. I detail the reasons for this
distinction in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 4
Absences as Causes 1
In previous chapters, I have been content to rebut the extent options for handling negative
causation. The non-relationalist strategy throws the baby out with the bathwater. In an
effort to retain our commonsense judgments that absences are often causes and effects,
the non-relationalist must reject many of our other commonsense judgments: If my failure
to water my houseplant causes its death, then so does President Obama’s failure. The
relationalist strategy, which straightaway rejects negative causation, is also wanting. The
relationalist derides commonsense; we systematically judge that negative causal statements
are true when they cannot be. But we have no satisfactory explanation for that error; an
appeal to causal explanation won’t suffice. It seems that we do distinguish causation from
causal explanation; worse yet, it doesn’t seem that absences can explain or be explained
unless negative causal claims can be true.
Admittedly, none of what I have advanced is sufficient to demonstrate that either non-
relationalism or relationalism, in its current form, are false. But the wedge is in. If I can
1. I would like to thank Phil Dowe, Robert Northcott, Andre´ Ariew, Evan Fales,
and Alicia Finch for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Earlier versions of this chapter
were also presented at the 2008 Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical
Association and the 2007 Meeting of the Central States Philosophical Association; I am
grateful for many helpful comments from the participants at each conference.
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demonstrate that relationalism is consistent with genuinism, then we have reason to prefer
the account I offer over the alternatives. We can vindicate commonsense and preserve
negative causation for other theoretical purposes in a way that satisfactorily tempers its
scope. What we need is negative causation, but not too much of it. The account that I
sketch in the current chapter, and develop more fully in the subsequent chapter, provides
just that.
In order to frame the development of my account, I take on the central arguments against
the possibility of negative causation in this chapter. Only with a clear bead on the argu-
ments against negative causation can an adequate account of negative causation take shape.
These arguments are, in many ways, old hat; they have been alluded to at various points
throughout the dissertation. The first — the ‘Intuition of Difference’ argument — addresses
the intuitive status of negative causation. Even if some absences seem intuitively causal,
others do not; additionally, absences are intuitively ‘less causal’ than positive causes. The
second — the ‘Theoretical Difficulties’ argument — trades on the problem of missing re-
lata. Accounts of causation — non-relationalism excepted — require both cause and effect,
and at least one of these is missing in cases of negative causation. Since I have set non-
relationalism aside, I have confined my account to the requirements of relationalism. We
must find the missing relata if negative causation is genuine causation. The ‘Theoretical
Difficulties’ argument clarifies this requirement.
These arguments represent the most sweeping criticisms of genuinism, and versions of
each are widespread. I reconstruct versions that Phil Dowe has recently presented. These
arguments are not unique to Dowe’s work, but Dowe’s presentation of them has the virtue
of being clear and focused. In what follows, I present and respond to both the ‘Intuition
of Difference’ and the ‘Theoretical Difficulties’ arguments in turn. In the final section
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of the paper, I offer a sketch of my account of negative causation (which is more fully
developed in Chapter Five). In this chapter, I orient this sketch in terms of Dowe’s preferred
account of causation, the Salmon-Dowe Process Theory. In Chapter Five, I fully develop
my account in terms of David Armstrong’s theory of singular causation. The moral is that
my account can remain largely agnostic as to which theory of causation is correct; negative
causal statements can be true and express genuine causation no matter which metaphysics
of causation prevail.
4.1 Are Absences Genuine Causes?
4.1.1 The ‘Intuition of Difference’ Argument
Ask the man on the street whether nothing can cause something. In all likelihood, he will
say, “No.” But ask the same man whether a negligent parent can cause his or her child
harm. Odds are that his intuitions will shift and he will reply, “Yes.” In his refutation
of genuinism, Phil Dowe takes pains to stress that this conflict of intuitions continues as
we consider various cases. What follows is a sample of a list he provides to highlight the
tension:
1. I caused the terrorist attack in London by failing to report information that I had
about it.
2. I caused the death of some penguins by failing to hire a plane and travel to the Antarc-
tic to intervene in a shark attack.2
2. Phil Dowe, “Causes are Physically Connected to Their Effects: Why Preventers
and Omissions are not Causes,” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, ed.
Christopher Hitchcock (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004): 191.
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It is quite natural to regard the first statement, but not the second, as providing genuinely
causal information. And this is the fundamental intuitive puzzle about absences as causes:
even if some absences seem genuinely causal, others certainly do not. The problem is that
both of these examples involve the absence of action: in either case, had I acted, the effect
would have been prevented. The only difference seems to be one of distance, and there is
no principled way of determining how much distance is too much. Accordingly, most of the
authors amenable to the possibility of absences as causes — non-relationalists — grant that
each is a case of causation.3 For such authors, the intuition of difference is explained away
by pragmatic considerations. Distance makes a difference to which causes we are inclined
to cite, but each is a cause nonetheless. As we have seen, this explanation is unsatisfactory.
For present purposes, we can bracket off the evaluation of the pragmatic approach. For
Dowe’s part, the upshot for our present discussion is that, if genuinism is true, then failing
to intervene a shark attack causes penguin death if failing to report information causes a
terrorist attack. And this is certainly counterintuitive. If preserving our intuitions about
particular cases is a primary motivation for genuinism, then that motivation is severely
undermined.
By this point, the ‘intuition of difference’ argument is an old saw. It is the difficulty that
galvanizes relationalism and it is the central difficulty the non-relationalist must face. But
we can push the issue further. There are two intuitions of difference that the relationalist
can exploit. On the one hand, there is the intuition of difference between plausible negative
causal claims, like ‘my failure to water my plant caused it to die’ and implausible negative
causal claims, like ‘Obama’s failure to water my plant caused it to die.’ On the other hand,
there is the intuition of difference between negative causal claims, like our plausible one,
3. Bennett, see n. 21; Lewis, “Causation as Influence,” see n. 1, See:
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and positive causal claims, like ‘my poisoning my plant caused it to die. In the latter case,
I kill my houseplant. In the former, I merely let it die. It is quite common to think that
killing is worse than letting die. We might translate this into causal terms and suggest that
killing is more causal than letting die. Hence there is a second intuition of difference, this
time between negative and positive causation.
We can reconstruct the argument quite simply:
P1. Intuitively, there is some difference between the causal status of ‘positive’ events and
‘negative’ events.
P2. If both negative events and positive events are genuinely causal (i.e., if genuinism is
true), then there is no difference.
Therefore, genuinism is false.
The point is that there is a strong intuition that even if failing to water my plant is a
cause of its death, it isn’t as causal as poisoning my plant. But does the difference depend
on some fundamental difference between negative and positive causation? I argue that it
does not.
To set the stage for my rebuttal, consider a case of two children playing catch. BASE-
BALL: One child throws a ball and the other child fails to catch it. As a result, it hits a
window and the window breaks. No doubt, the child who threw the baseball caused the
windows to break. Even if we accept that the other child’s failure, the absence of the catch,
is a cause, it certainly doesn’t seem to be a cause in the same way as the throw. Examples
like this are standard issue in the genuinist’s critic’s arsenal. Just as we saw in Dowe’s
earlier example, they are meant to show that negative causation and positive causation are
intuitively different.
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Fortunately for the genuinist, this strategy is a double-edged sword. I argue that the
baseball example does not highlight an intuitive difference between negative and positive
causation. Rather, the baseball case merely demonstrates that some causes are merely more
salient than others. The same could be said for the terrorist attack case. Not only is this
unsurprising, it is hardly a mark against genuinism. Consider a case where the positive
cause is less salient than the negative cause. FIRE: A wildfire rages through the Pacific
Northwest. The causal history of FIRE is as follows. After long periods of drought, a
lightening strike catches a tree on fire and spreads, becoming an uncontrollable wildfire.
The negative cause is the drought, or the absence of rain. The positive cause is the lightning
strike or the burning tree, which ever you like. The upshot is that a reporter and her audience
would likely find the lightning strike hardly worth mentioning. What matters is the drought.
Here we have a case where the negative cause is intuitively more causally relevant than the
positive cause. (The popular way of expressing this would be to say that the drought really
caused the fire.)
In both BASEBALL and FIRE, we have positive and negative causes. In BASEBALL,
the positive cause is more salient. But this should not lead us to think that negative causes
are not genuine causes, since there are equally compelling cases — like FIRE — where the
negative cause is more salient. When asked about the cause of some event, there certainly
are cases where we would mention some positive cause and ignore the negative causes. But
in other cases, we are inclined to mention the negative cause alone. Foresters are far more
concerned with dry fields than lightning strikes, but home owners are more concerned with
baseball throwers than they are with bad catchers.
Thus far, I have taken care to point out that Dowe’s ‘intuition of difference’ does not
cut along negative and positive lines. Instead, the source of the intuition is causal salience.
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If we cherry-pick cases, then we can list ones when the positive cause is intuitively more
causal than the negative causes — but only if we cherry pick. A broad and inclusive as-
sessment of cases shows that, very often, negative causes are intuitively more casual than
positive ones. This point becomes all the more clear when we consider cases where the
causally efficacious absence is either hidden in the causal chain or mis-described as a pos-
itive event. Thus far, I have considered cases where the putative cause is clearly some ab-
sence. There are many more cases that appear to be cases of positive causation, yet, upon
closer inspection, turn out to involve absences. The analyses of such cases do two things:
One, we see that, with such cases of ‘hidden negative causation,’ there is no intuition of
difference. Two, we get a clearer picture of the ubiquity of negative causation.
Consider a case that sounds like a case of positive causation. MURDER: A murderer
shoots and kills another person. On the surface, MURDER looks like a clear case of pos-
itive causation. We have a cause, either the gunshot or the gunshot wound, and an effect,
the death of the other person. However, gun shot wounds typically cause a massive loss of
blood, and it is the absence of blood that does the victim in. If the intuition of difference
tracked the negative/positive cause distinction, then our causal intuitions about MURDER
should shift upon learning the actual etiology. But they don’t. The gunshot wound, a
negative cause of death, is still the genuine cause. Furthermore, the absence of blood is
more salient then any of the other positive facts that might be causally relevant. Our judg-
ments about MURDER remain solid: Gunshot wounds are, unfortunately, genuine causes
of death.
Examples like MURDER not only further the point that there is no intuition of differ-
ence concerning negative and positive causation, they also highlight just what is at stake. If
negative causation is not genuine causation, then a vast array of intuitive causal judgments
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turns out to be false. For instance, if we reject negative causation, then smoking doesn’t
cause cancer. The standard view is that carcinogens typically shut off the natural growth
inhibitors in cells resulting in abnormal growth.4 It is the absence of those inhibitors that
matter. But if absences aren’t causes, then Big Tobacco wins. Clearly, the costs of aban-
doning negative causation are great.
Dowe’s conclusion is that we can only get so much mileage out of a survey of our
intuitions. He writes:
If this analysis is correct, it spells the failure of any argument that appeals sim-
ply to “folk intuitions” about some particular case to establish (1) that indeed it
is a case of causation, and (2) that a theory of causation that gives the opposite
result is therefore wrong.5
This goes for relationalists and non-relationalists alike who merely offer quips about the
commonsense status of any particular putative case of negative causation. On this point,
I agree. We require more than intuitions to make our case. As Dowe points out, many
well-entrenched intuitions have been overturned. It was once thought to be the case — and
it still looks like it is the case — that the sun rises. However, our best empirical theories
entail that the sun does not rise, despite appearances. Examples like this are often trotted
out to demonstrate the fallibility of commonsense. However, what we have in the case of
4. This paradigm has been recently challenged; see A.M. Soto and C. Sonnenschein,
“The Somatic Mutation Theory of Cancer: Growing Problems with the Paradigm?” Bioes-
says 26, no. 10 (2004): 1097–1107. However, the basic point remains. No matter the un-
derlying biochemical process, our judgments that smoking causes cancer remain robust.
Whether or not smoking causes cancer does not depend, in the least, on whether the bio-
chemical pathway involves abnormal growth because of an absence of growth regulators or
the presence of some growth producing chemical.
5. Dowe, “Causes are Physically Connected to Their Effects: Why Preventers and
Omissions are not Causes,” see n. 2: 191.
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the rising sun, but we don’t have for negative causation, is a good explanation for why it
appears to us that the sun rises when it doesn’t.
Without such an explanation, the evidential weight of intuitions remains at the fore.
I maintain that an adequate theory of causation will either preserve our commonsense
judgments or adequately explain our mistakes. We have seen that an appeal to causal
explanation will not suffice. Dowe offers an alternate explanation, given in terms of quasi-
causation, or possible causation. Before addressing Dowe’s own explanation, I turn now to
the ‘Theoretical Difficulties’ argument.
4.1.2 The ‘Theoretical Difficulties’ Argument
The ‘Intuition of Difference’ argument is supposed to make us question the evidential value
of our intuitions about negative causation. If our intuitions under-determine our commit-
ment to negative causation, then the ‘Theoretical Difficulties’ argument is poised to turn
the tide against it. The upshot is that our extant theories of causation cannot account for
negative causation.6 Of course, if the intuitive case for negative causation were clear, such
a failure would be reason enough to replace those theories with onces that could account
for negative causation. But the intuitive case is not clear — so much the worse for negative
causation. This is the one-two punch of the genuinist’s opponents.
The ‘Theoretical Difficulties’ argument exploits the problem of the missing relata. This
problem undergirds many of the objections to negative causation that have been raised
throughout the dissertation. Here we reconstruct and deal with the problem with greater
care. Dowe considers three predominant accounts of causation and argues that none can
6. Dowe, “A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and ‘Causation’ by Omission,” see
n. 1.
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accommodate negative causation. The crucial point is that each considers causation a re-
lation, and relations need that which negative causal claims appear unable to provide —
both relata, cause and effect. The view under consideration are: (1) Lewis’s view that cau-
sation is a relationship that holds between events; (2) Armstrong’s view that causation is a
relationship between facts; and, (3) The Salmon-Dowe account that analyzes causation in
terms of connecting physical processes. I reconstruct the basic argument:
P1 If genuinism is true, then things that didn’t happen are causes of things that did
happen.
P2 Causation is either analyzable in terms of relations between events (Lewis) or states
of affairs (Armstrong) or in terms of sets of connecting processes and interactions
(Salmon).
P3 Things that don’t happen can’t bear relations to things.
P4 States of affairs that don’t obtain can’t bear relations to other states of affairs.
P5 Things that don’t happen can’t be connected by processes or interact with things.
C Therefore, genuinism is false
The Lewis and Armstrong approaches analyze causation in terms of relations between
cause-effect pairs, where those relata are either taken to be singular events or states of
affairs. Lewis takes it as a principle that relations must relate something to something.78
7. This is the primary reason that Lewis later rejects the view that causation is a
relation. See (Lewis, “Causation as Influence,” see n. 1; Lewis, “Void and Object,” see n. 2)
8. Dowe, “A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and ‘Causation’ by Omission,” see
n. 1: 219.
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So if negative events are those that don’t occur and negative facts are those that don’t obtain,
then negative causation is impossible.
There is a related difficulty for process accounts of causation, like the Salmon-Dowe
‘conserved quantity’ theory of causation. Dowe provides a rough outline of this account:
A causal interaction is an intersection of world-lines that involves the exchange
of a conserved quantity... A causal process is the world-line of an object that
transmits a non-zero amount of a conserved quantity at each moment of its
history (each space time point of its trajectory).9
Dowe goes on to clarify transmission of a conserved quantity:
A process transmits a conserved quantity between A and B (A6=B) if and only
if it possesses [a fixed amount of] this quantity at A and at B and at every stage
of the process between A and B without any interactions in the open interval
(A,B) that involves an exchange of that particular conserved quantity.10
The idea is this: Causal processes are those that can transmit a signal via some physi-
cally possible pathway. The signal just is the conserved quantity that moves from A to B
in virtue of the connection between A and B, rather than by some intervention from the
outside (i.e., it’s not the case that if C causes A and B that the movement from A to B
or from B to A represents a causal process). The upshot is that A and B can be anything
that involves the possession of a conserved quantity, “facts, events, or whatever”11 Well, so
long as that anything is something. Dowe puts the problem this way:
But clearly neither omissions, however they are understood, nor preventing
events are linked to their ‘effects’ by this sort of connection. There is no set
of processes and interactions connecting either the father’s failure to grab the
child with the accident, nor the father’s grabbing the child with the absence of
the accident.12
9. Dowe, “Causation and Misconnections,” see n. 3: 926.
10. Ibid.: 927.
11. Ibid.: 927.
12. Dowe, “A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and ‘Causation’ by Omission,” see
n. 1: 220.
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If causes are things linked to their effects by processes and interactions, then absences
can’t be causes. Nothing can’t be linked to something. And so much the worse for gen-
uinism: Dowe argues that it suffers both intuitive and theoretical problems. The genuinist
challenge — the one that I take on — is to vindicate negative causation in a way that does
not link ‘nothing’ to ‘something.’
4.1.3 Absences as Quasi-Causes
We see that Dowe’s reasons for rejecting negative causation are akin to Beebee’s reasons.
Negative causation violates the basic relational character of causation. But what of the
intuitive puzzle? My failure to water my house plant seems to cause the plant’s death.
To explain away our intuitions about the seemingly causal role of some absences, Beebee
argued that we confuse causation with causal explanation. However, in Chapter 3, I argued
that this approach fails. Dowe offers an alternative explanation; Dowe offers a theory of
‘Quasi-Causation.’ The idea is that while only positive events count as genuinely causal,
talk about absences is talk about possible causation. Call absences quasi-causes. Quasi-
causes are defined in terms of actual causation (which explains their causal appearance).
Roughly, some negative event not-O quasi-causes some event E if E occurred and if O had
occurred, then E wouldn’t have.13 The prize is the preservation of positive causation qua
causation and the explanation of our intuitions about some absences being causes.
There are two ways in which absences are thought to be causally relevant. There are
omissions and preventers. Thus, on Dowe’s account, these are the two kinds of quasi-
causes. Omissions are absences that quasi-cause positive events, whereas preventers are
13. Dowe, “Causes are Physically Connected to Their Effects: Why Preventers and
Omissions are not Causes,” see n. 2: 193.
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positive events that quasi-cause absences. Or there can be prevention by an absence: not-A
quasi-causes not-B. To simplify matters, I will deal with omissions alone. Consider Dowe’s
formal analysis of omission:
Omission: not-A quasi-caused B if B occurred and A did not, and there oc-
curred an x such that: (O1) x caused B, and (O2) if A had occurred then A
would have prevented B by interacting with x where A and B name positive
events/facts and x is a variable ranging over facts or events, and where preven-
tion is analyzed as above [see my general characterization of quasi-causation
above].14
This analysis gets our intuitions right if we plug in ‘I failed to water my houseplant’
for A and ‘the houseplant dies’ for B. The point is this: Dowe sets out to offer a principled
account of absences as quasi-causes such that genuine causation is reserved for positive
events in a causal sequence. Our folk intuitions about absences as causes get cashed out
in terms of quasi-causation. And we have an explanation for our inconsistent intuitive
judgments about the causal efficacy of failures to water plants.
4.2 Yes, Absences are Genuine Causes
Dowe’s solution is attractive; however, it only moves the puzzle, it doesn’t solve or dissolve
it. On my read, both Dowe and the genuinist have a bullet to bite, and it is the very same
bullet. Both views afford failures to water your houseplants and failures to stop shark
attacks half-way across the world the same metaphysical status. Unfortunately, failing
to intervene a shark attack quasi-causes penguins to die just in case failing water your
houseplant quasi-causes the plant to die. Dowe is supposedly on better footing — since he
insulates “real” causation from these concerns — but the value of this insulation doesn’t
run very deep. As Dowe admits, the Big Bang might be the cause of everything.
14. Dowe, “Causes are Physically Connected to Their Effects: Why Preventers and
Omissions are not Causes,” see n. 2: 193.
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Typically, we think of longer chains as not causation even though they are, because
they are less within our control. Thus in law there is usually a ‘break’ before the chain is
traced back too far, even though the definition of causation utilized in law sine non qua
is transitive. The same treatment can be given for cases like “the big bang caused today’s
rain.”15
Dowe argues that this implication is unproblematic, since he doesn’t take intuitions to
be the primary source of data about causation.16 His is an empirical analysis of causation,
drawing its primary support from our best scientific theories. The ‘intuition of difference’
argument is only an argument against those who are inclined to accept genuinism in light
of our intuitive judgments about the causal status of absences. For Dowe’s part, the ‘theo-
retical difficulties’ argument has the last word.
In light of this, it is fair to pose the following question: Does an empirical analysis of
causation, given the ‘conserved quantity’ account of causation (Dowe’s preferred theory
of causation), support the denial of genuinism? I argue that it does not. Dowe’s empirical
analysis of causation gives us no a priori reason to reject absences as causes and that
an empirical investigation will very often support the claim that absences are causes. I
reject P5 of Dowe’s ‘Theoretical Difficulties’ argument. (In the following chapter, I wage
a similar argument with regard to states of affairs. I further maintain that the same could be
said for events.) In what follows, I will argue that ‘absences’ can be connected by processes
or interact with things.
First, I should introduce a caveat. In the introduction, I claimed that the notion of
an ‘absence’ has been misunderstood. There is a sense in which the demand for entities
15. Dowe, “Causation and Misconnections,” see n. 3: 929.
16. Ibid.: 927.
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as causal relata rules genuinism out a priori. After all, if we take genuinism to be the
view that non-entities can be causal relata, the view is a non-starter. But I don’t think we
should take genuinism in that way. Rather, genuinism is the claim that everyday, ordinary
‘absences’ (e.g., a lack of water) are genuine causes. To assume that such absences are non-
entities is to stack the deck against genuinism, but nothing about genuinism demands such
an assumption. I take genuinism to be the view that sentences of the form, “The absence of
x caused y” are very often true and express genuine causal relations.17
My position is that such ‘absences’ are absences by description. To clarify my view,
we should consider an example. Take this state of affairs: That the plant wilted. As it
goes, a plant wilts when the turgor pressure of its cells is decreased. The turgor pressure is
just the pressure of the cell so that there is a force exerted from the inside keeping the cell
inflated. (Water your house plant with salt water and it will wilt because change in osmotic
pressure causes water to leave the plant cells.) Now, return to our state of affairs, “That the
plant wilted.” (For convenience, imagine the relative cellular pressures inside the cell and
outside the cell are either ‘high’ or ‘low’ with respect to one another.) Now why did the
plant wilt? Presumably, we would cite the fact, ‘That the turgor pressure was low.’ That is,
we would cite an absence of sufficient turgor pressure.
Dowe addresses a point in this area. Due to epistemic limitations, we may be unable
to tell whether a particular fact is positive or negative. Take the example, “Smoking causes
heart disease.” Since smoking likely prevents the natural function of the heart, smoking
is most likely a quasi-cause of heart disease. Dowe goes on to note that quasi-causation
is practically equivalent to genuine causation; for instance, quasi-causation might track
17. A genuinist of my bent would also claim that the same holds for sentences where
the absence is an effect or both cause and effect.
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moral responsibility.18 As a result, there is confusion, but the problem is merely epistemic.
Metaphysically, Dowe insists, the cause/quasi-cause distinction is robust.
My point goes beyond mere practical equivalence. Notice how easily ‘positive’ facts
become ‘negative’ facts. Consider the following triplet of sentences relating to an absence
of turgor pressure:
1. There was an absence of sufficient turgor pressure.
2. The osmotic pressure inside the cell was lower than the pressure outside the cell.
3. The osmotic pressure outside the cell was higher than the pressure inside the cell.
No doubt, the truth of each of the above statements is grounded, in some particular cir-
cumstance, by the very state of the world which consists of the plant cell and its immediate
environment. It is uncontroversial that high pressure states are capable of being causal, so
too are low pressure states. Our decision to call this particular state a high or low pressure
state is largely arbitrary, depending on contextual factors. So too with our decision to de-
scribe the state as an absence of turgor pressure. And the problem isn’t merely epistemic.
Each ‘fact’ is merely a description of the way the world is. The absence of turgor pres-
sure just is the osmotic pressure differential. The distinction so-called ‘positive facts’ and
‘negative facts’ isn’t a metaphysical distinction.
My critic might argue that I have misconstrued the plant example. Properly speaking, a
wilted plant just is a plant with low cellular pressure. Certainly, facts about wilted plants are
positive facts, since they clearly assert the way the world is, rather than the way the world
18. Dowe, “Causes are Physically Connected to Their Effects: Why Preventers and
Omissions are not Causes,” see n. 2: 194.
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isn’t. What the genuinist really needs is to show that the wilting of the plant is caused by
an absence of water.
Perhaps this criticism is more serious for the genuinism if we assume a singular event
causal account. While I think that it is not, here I leave it an open question. Instead, consider
whether a process causal theorist can make this criticism. Recall the process account:
Causal processes are those that can transmit a signal via some physically possible pathway.
Following Salmon, we can clarify signal transmission in terms of ‘mark transmission.’
MT: Let P be a process that, in the absence of interactions with other processes,
would remain uniform with respect to a characteristic Q, which it would man-
ifest consistently over an interval that includes both of the space-time points A
and B (A6=B). Then, a mark (consisting of a modification of Q into Q’), which
has been introduced into the process P by means of a single local interaction at
point A, is transmitted to point B if P manifests the modification Q’ at B and at
all stages of the process between A and B without additional interventions.19
The notion of mark transmission is introduced to distinguish between processes and
pseudo-processes, where only processes are capable of genuine causal influence. To hone
in on a process, consider a standard example of a pseudo-process: If I shine a light on a
wall and move it, the apparent movement of the spot is a pseudo-process. The process is
the transmission of the light to the spot on the wall, not the light from the various spots on
the wall to the others. This is because the moving spot on the wall cannot transmit a mark;
a modification of one spot on the wall (imagine painting that spot red) does not persist to
the next spot on the wall. However, if we introduce a red filter at the source of the light,
the resulting red spot is transmitted by a genuine causal process; the red spot is transmitted
throughout the process.
19. Wesley C. Salmon, “Statistical Explanation and Causality,” in Theories of Expla-
nation, ed. Joseph Pitt (n. p.: Oxford University Press, 1988): 89.
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Salmon immediately notes a concern with MT: The principle is clearly counterfactual.
To allay worries about the subjective nature of counterfactuals, Salmon claims that the
counterfactuals are to be experimentally determined. In short, whether a putative process is
capable of transmitting a mark will be experimentally determined.20 And this works nicely
with Dowe’s empirical analysis of causation.
So why can’t ‘absences,’ like an absence of water, transmit a mark? If processes are
to be determined experimentally, there is no principled reason why they cannot. Consider
a process P, the osmotic equilibrium of a healthy, well-watered plant cell. This process
manifests itself as a stable ionic equilibrium with respect to a characteristic Q, the turgor
pressure of that cell over some interval. Then a mark is introduced to P as a modification of
Q into Q’. In this case, the mark is a lack of water, introduced by evaporation and normal
plant metabolism. The resulting characteristic Q’ is low turgor pressure. From the point of
the mark’s introduction, it is transmitted without further intervention by P. The plant wilts,
and the wilting was caused by an absence of water.
The genuinist’s critic could bite the bullet and claim that the evaporation of water is a
genuine cause of the wilting of the plant, but that an absence of water is not. But this would
be a trivial rejection of genuinism. After all, the evaporation of the water is preventing the
health of the plant in this same way that smoking prevents the health of a smoker’s heart,
something Dowe is prepared to call quasi-causation. It is well-known that smoking results
in heart disease, in large part, due to the decrease in oxygen delivered to the heart. We
could give the same analysis for smoking and heart disease that we gave for evaporation and
wilted plants. Smoking introduces a modification to the health of the smoker — a lowering
of blood oxygen — that is transmitted through the process without further intervention.
20. Salmon, “Statistical Explanation and Causality,” see n. 19: 90.
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So far, this bodes well for the genuinist. We at least get the result that smoking gen-
uinely causes heart disease, just as we can say that the removal of water by evaporation
causes the plant to wilt (and eventually die). But, can we say that an absence of water
causes a plant to wilt? I think we can. Think back to the red filter case from our clarifica-
tion of mark transmission, where a red filter is affixed to the light source. We wouldn’t have
any trouble calling this a causal process, as the process (light beam) transmits a mark (red
light). And we wouldn’t have any trouble saying that the red filter is a cause of the red light
spot, it is the intervention that makes the mark. Similarly, in the plant case, the process
(osmotic equilibrium) transmits the mark (shift in equilibrium) by way of the intervention,
the removal of water. So we call the removal of water a cause of the wilting — no problem.
My point is that it is very odd to say that the removal of water is a cause of the wilting but
that the absence of water isn’t. The expression, ’the absence of water,’ picks out a state of
affairs at a certain point of the process, ‘the removal of water by evaporation.’ (It picks out
the end of the process.) We should not say that a process is causal, yet a particular point in
that very process is not.
The analysis I have provided at least shows that, given a process account of causation,
we can genuinely consider some absences as causes. This has the nice result of vindicating
many of our intuitive judgments. But, when we consider examples that involve agential
inaction, matters are more complicated. For instance, we can’t yet say that my failure to
water the plant caused it to die. These cases are much more difficult; in what follows, I will
sketch how we might handle them.
Consider an example of parental neglect. SWIMMING: A father takes his child swim-
ming. The father acts negligently and fails to supervise his child and she drowns. Here
we want to say more than an absence of supervision caused the child to drown, we want
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to say that the father’s absence of supervision is a cause. This is, of course, more difficult,
since we need to be able to specify the process by which the father’s negligence transmits
a mark. For a start, Let P be the process ‘parental care’ and Q be the characteristic ‘the
child’s safety.’ Take Q to manifest itself consistently over an interval— perhaps the father
had been diligent up until now. Then a mark is introduced, which consists in a modification
of the child’s safety Q into the child’s peril Q’. It seems that this process P satisfies the
principle, MT. The modification Q’ manifests itself at all stages of the process since its
introduction, and is transmitted to point B, which is sadly, the child’s demise. By satisfying
MT, the father’s negligence — the absence of his care — counts as a cause of the child’s
death.
Salmon and Dowe would surely object. After all, the causal process must be a phys-
ically possible pathway, and SWIMMING seems to involve action at a distance. In the
‘process’ I specify above, there does not seem to be the sort of physical connection exhib-
ited by the smoking and absence of water cases. I should point out that the possibility of
action at a distance is an empirical question, as troubling a notion as it seems to be. For-
tunately, we need not appeal to action at a distance to make sense of SWIMMING. There
is plenty to connect the father to the child. They are, of course, part of the same causal
system. To demonstrate this, return to the notion of a causal interaction, or an intersec-
tion of world-lines that involves the exchange of a conserved quantity. This intersecting of
‘world-lines’ is essential to our notion of a system, a complex unity of interacting and in-
terdependent parts. Just as these intersections make up the web of causation wherein plant
cells interact systematically with their environments, so too for the systematic interaction
of parents with their children. In so far as the father is a proper part of the relevant system,
his failure to act is just as causal as the water that entered the child’s lungs.
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I argue that we only fail to specify causal processes connecting negligent parents to the
plight of their children when we individuate systems narrowly. So long as the negligent
father is considered a proper part of the causal system that culminates in the drowning of
the child, he is a cause of her death. Moreover, we cannot help but recognize the sys-
tematic relationship between plants and the soil that surrounds their roots. Similarly, we
are disinclined to regard our failure to intervene a shark attack as a cause of a penguin’s
death because we don’t typically individuate systems that broadly. And this parallels the
problem concerning the Big Bang causing everything else. This is an event if there ever
was one, but we hesitate to call it the cause of my writing this essay because it requires us
to broadly construe the relevant causal network. The moral is that the fundamental puzzle
about absences as causes is dissolved if we focus on how we individuate causal subsystems
from within the causal nexus, in toto. In this essay, I cannot say much about how this in-
dividuation should proceed. Here, I am content to point out that there are causal processes
connecting the negligent father and his child. If this seems a sort of causal misconnection,
it isn’t any more troubling than the connections between the big bang and everything else.
And the Big Bang is something that Dowe and like-minded theorists are well-prepared to
call a genuine cause.
When we consider absences like ’the absence of water,’ we can avoid the unpalatable
ontological explosion of causes that imperils non-relationalist. Admittedly, this is more
difficult to avoid when we introduce agential inaction. If the father’s negligence is a cause
of the child’s death in SWIMMING, what must we say about everyone else who didn’t
save the child? The answer lies in the specification of the causal process. The relevant
process P is ‘Parental Care.’ This is the process which relates the father to his child, and
excludes others who might have saved the child. In Chapter 3, I offered a contextualist
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response to similar problems involving little Johnny’s failure to turn off the gas. I further
examine this issue in Chapter 6. For present purposes, it is sufficient to show that, for the
process account, whether agential inaction counts as a cause is determined by the scope of
the process in question. How these processes are individuated is another matter, and may
require additional assumptions, like the contextualist assumption active in Chapter 3.
4.3 Conclusion
If we take seriously an empirical analysis of causation, we cannot prima facie rule out neg-
ative causation. And given the experimental basis of the process theory of causation, we
have plenty of reasons to suggest that ‘absences’ are perfectly capable of transmitting a
mark. But the ‘absences’ we speak of are merely absences by description. The man’s neg-
ligence is not some sort of non-entity; his negligence consists in the very state of the man’s
existence and his activities. As such, his negligence is perfectly capable of transmitting a
mark.
At the end of the day, there is only one causal nexus. However, inquiries concerning
causation always make essential reference to a portion of that causal system, individuated
narrowly or broadly. The Big Bang is the cause of this essay if my being in a philosophy
department is, but not if we’re only talking about recent events. So too with negligence:
The man’s negligence is the cause of the child’s death, but not if we are only interested in
the physiological system. And even there is a context wherein we are a cause of penguin
death, our distal connection shouldn’t keep us up at night.
On the account I advocate, causal disconnections and misconnections are context de-
pendent and determined by the relevant request for causal information. When a biology
professor asks her students, “What caused the plant to wilt?” it won’t do any good to reply,
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“Nobody watered it.” But if my spouse asks, I had better not cite low turgor pressure. The
appropriateness of each regards an embedded reference to a particular causal subsystem,
but both replies, properly speaking, involve essentially causal information.
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Chapter 5
Ontologically Serious Genuinism
As we have seen, our intuitions about particular cases suggest that absences can be, and
very often are, genuine causes. However, major theories of causation render negative causa-
tion –causation by or of absences –incoherent. Causation is typically taken to be a relation,
and relations must relate something to something else. Negative causation seems to imply
causation by or of nothing. In the previous chapter, I argued that this is a misunderstand-
ing of absences. ‘Absences,’ at least those intuitively causal ones, are not metaphysical
absences. Rather, negative causal statements specify causes or effects – uncontroversial
positive entities – negatively. Thus the truth of negative causal statements does not commit
us to the existence of negative entities – a troubling proposition.
To this point, I have not developed a full account of negative causation. Rather, I have
demonstrated that there is no clear intuition of difference between negative and positive
causation and that the extant accounts of causation only rule out the possibility of causal
non-entities. The critic of genuinism may agree on the matter of the intution of difference,
and discount our commonsense judgments that absences are ever causes or effects. How-
ever, any intuition of difference that one might suggest is more plausibly explained in terms
of salience. After all, events have many causes and our indication of ‘the cause’ is typically
a matter of contextual factors. Often, our interests will regularly pick out negative causes as
80
well as positive ones. Furthermore, I have highlighted just how pervasive negative causa-
tion is in our commonsense causal claims. Many instances of seemingly positive causation
turn out to be, on further inspection, instances of negative causation.
In the previous chapter, I sketched an account of negative causation given the process
theory of causation. On this approach, negative causal claims describe features of a gen-
uinely causal process. The slogan is that negative causation is only negative at the level
of description. In this chapter, I further develop this account, and carefully specify how it
functions from within a highly restrictive account of causation, D.M. Armstrong’s account
of singular causation. The motivation is this: Armstrong’s account is highly restrictive,
specifying within a narrow range what is genuine causation. I argue that even given these
restrictions, Armstrong’s account does permit a range of true negative causal claims.
The strategy that I employ in the context of Armstrong’s view of causation is instruc-
tive for how we should regard negative causation, generally. The upshot of my account is
that true negative causal claims have as their truthmakers actual (positive) entities (states of
affairs for Armstrong’s part). The lesson is that causally efficacious absences are not onto-
logically spurious non-entities; they perfectly ordinary entities capable of bearing relations
to other things. This general lesson is applicable well-beyond the confines of Armstrong’s
account. Any relational account of causation can recognize the causal status of absences
of the sort I describe. Such absences are not metaphysical absences and they require no
ontological addition. Thus, my account of genuinism –the view that absences are genuine
causes –is ontologically serious genuinism.
In this chapter, I show that negative causation is consistent with Armstrong’s view of
causation and, a fortiori, our pretheoretical causal realism. I sketch the basic features
of Armstrong’s account and reconstruct his arguments against negative causation. With
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this in place, I proceed to show that a certain class of important negative causal claims is
consistent with Armstrong’s account. This class of causal claims satisfies his theoretical
requirements and avoids his argument against the possibility of negative causation. On the
strongest reading of Armstrong’s view, my account provides a counterexample to his argu-
ment against negative causation. On a weaker reading, my account provides an amendment
to Armstrong’s account, allowing it to recognize negative causation as genuine causation.
On either reading, I preserve both the possibility of negative causation and the relational
nature of causation.
5.1 The Case for Singular Causation
As strong as the intuitions in favor of negative causation are, there are equally compelling
intuitions about the nature of causation that push against genuinism. Consider a single
causal occurrence where a causes b. For a Humean, of course, causation is just a general
regularity and our single causal occurrence is just an instantiation of the regularity. How-
ever, as Armstrong points out, the Humean view fails to answer an intuitively important
question: In virtue of what does this particular a bring about this particular b?1
Intuitively, there is an answer to this question. Imagine a world without any regularities
at all. For the Humean, this would be a world without causation. However, this position is
deeply unsatisfying. At least, it isn’t clear that such a world would be void of causation.
It might be the case that token events still bring about other token events, even if they do
so without any regularity whatsoever. Intuitively, it is still possible in such a world for a to
bring about b. If so, then we require an account of singular causation, rather than a mere
regularity account of general causation. The central thesis of singular causation is that the
1. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, see n. 1: 202.
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causal relation holds between cause and effect alone, independently of anything else (e.g.,
regularities).2
The issue of singular causation lies at the core of a deep debate between Humeans
and causal realists, like Armstrong, but for present purposes we can bracket this issue.
What concerns us now is, if the realist intuition about singular causation is correct, is
negative causation possible? To get at this question, I will turn to a brief argument for
singular causation. This argument serves to highlight the intuition that singular causation
is a real phenomenon. After establishing the merits of this intuition, I will explicate a
predominant view of singular causation (Armstrong’s) and his arguments that purport to
show that realism about singular causation precludes negative causation.
Armstrong reconstructs an argument, which he credits to earlier work by Michael Too-
ley and John Foster, that aims to demonstrate the existence of real singular causation. We
begin by describing a simple case of direct causation in a two-dimensional world (for con-
venience). Imagine two particles, C1 and C2 at some distance d from one another. Each
particle is governed by the same law such that there is some probability (< 1) that it will
produce some effect e (some other particle) at some distance l from it. For the purposes of
the example, keep d < l so that the range of locations that each particle is capable produc-
ing its effect overlap at two points. In the example, e is produced at one of the points of
intersection. Following Tooley and Foster, Armstrong claims that there is some objective
fact of the matter as to which of the two particles produced e. To be sure, there is the
possibility of overdetermination, where both produced e, but even that would count as an
objective fact. (Of course, we might struggle to determine whether C1, C2, or both C1 and
C2 is the cause of e, but this is merely an epistemic limitation. All that matters is that we
2. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, see n. 1: 202.
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think that one of those options is the real cause.) This particular example tells against the
Humean approach, since a mere regularity theory could not, even in principle, distinguish
between our options and pick out the actual cause.3
The above possible case highlights the intuition that causation involves a direct relation-
ship between cause and effect. If we accept the assumption that there is a fact of the matter
as to which particle brought about e, then the example provides a reason to endorse singular
causation. As an argument, this is circular, and Armstrong is well-aware of this problem.
Merely accepting the assumption, which is supposed to argue for singular causation, is tan-
tamount to accepting singular causation. 4 The value of this case is not its argumentative
force; rather it is the clarity with which it highlights our intuitive commitment to singular
causation. If there is an objective fact as to which cause C1 or C2 produced e, then singular
causation exists. It is, of course, open to the Humean to reject the singularist intuition, but,
for our purposes, it suffices to merely point out the strength of the intuition. As Armstrong
puts the point,
That singular causation does exist, and that the world’s work is done by such
causing, is the natural assumption of all those who have not fallen under the
Humean spell. Anybody who thinks about the mechanism of a thing or process,
arguably even the physicist working at the level of quantum physics, is trying
to determine the causal pattern of operation in the thing or process, and thinks
of it as a causal pattern that exists at the singular level.5
3. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, see n. 1.
4. Armstrong is well-aware of this problem, it seems. Armstrong says that, “Tooley
and Foster think of themselves as arguing for negative causation. And despite the merely
possible nature of the case, it does, with its ease and naturalness, constitute some argument
for the real, non-relational, existence of singular causation.” (Ibid.: 204) However, it is
clear that Armstrong only intends Tooley and Foster’s case to give intuitive support for the
singular causal view.
5. Ibid.: 204.
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The trouble for the genuinist is that there doesn’t appear to be anything that exists at
the singular level to ground negative causation. The realists’s alter call is heralded with
the mantra, from nothing, nothing comes. Consider our paradigmatic example of negative
causation, ‘the absence of water caused the plant to die.’ Armstrong says of this particular
example that such a statement might well be true, but the truthmaker will not be a causal
relation holding between an absence, the lack of water, and some effect, the death of the
plant. An absence of water is nothing at all, and cannot, therefore, be causally productive.
6
There is some question as to how we should take Armstrong’s admission of the ‘truth,’
of some negative causal statements with his insistence that there is no negative causation.
I take Armstrong to be claiming that such true ‘negative causal’ statements are not true
causal statements, but rather truths of some other kind.7 Armstrong quite clearly states that
absences never enter into causal relations. And this is no surprise: if causation is a singular
dyadic relation that obtains between a cause and its effect, then its relata must be entities,
which absences certainly are not.
However, as earlier noted, he is willing to accept that many negative causal statements
are true. We have two options for interpreting Armstrong’s position. On the one hand, we
might say that not all true causal statements express causal relations. But on this reading,
6. What exactly does serve as the truthmaker is left an open question in. (Armstrong,
A World of States of Affairs, see n. 1) However, in later works, Armstrong has endorsed Phil
Dowe’s account of ’quasi-causation.’ The idea is that putative negative causal statements
express quasi-causation. So negative causal statements are really ’quasi-causal’ statements
that express possible, but not actual causation. (See: D. M. Armstrong, “Going Through
the Open Door Again,” in Causation and Counterfactuals, ed. Ned Hall John Collins and
L. A. Paul (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004))
7. See: Phil Dowe, “Review article: A World of States of Affairs by D. M. Armstrong,”
Mind 107, no. 427 (1998): 669–672.
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it is unclear what, exactly, true negative causal statements express. On the other hand, we
might say that statements of the form, ‘the absence of x caused y’ are very often true, but
despite appearances, are not causal statements. I’m not sure what hangs on our choice at
this point, but the latter option seems most amenable to the balance of Armstrong’s work
on the matter.8 What matters for us now is that according to Armstrong, negative causal
statements –whatever they express –do not express causal relations. Hence, there is no
negative causation.
The degree to which a genuinist would object to Armstrong’s position thus construed
is unclear. On the one hand, the genuinist may only insist that statements of the form, ‘the
absence of x caused y’ are true and not worry too much about the underlying metaphysics.
But such a small concession should not console the genuinist. I maintain that negative
causal sentences are not only true, but express genuine causal relations; this is the only
version of genuinism worthy of the name.
In this section, I have highlighted the strength of the causal realist intuition: We think
that there is an objective fact as to what causes what at the singular level. If all and only
what goes on at this level is genuine causation, then the genuinist must be able to account
for absences at the singular level. I think that this can be done, and I offer an account that
strives to do it in the final section. Before we get there, though, I set out Armstrong’s view
of singular causation and reconstruct the arguments he provides against genuinism. Once
his account is in place, I will be in a position to demonstrate that the version of genuinism
I advocate is consistent with it.
8. Armstrong, “Going Through the Open Door Again,” see n. 6.
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5.2 Armstrong’s Account of Singular Causation
On Armstrong’s view, causation is a contingent relation that depends on what occurs in the
actual world. Concrete particulars do the causing, and, in turn, get caused. The intuition
underwriting this view is strong. When a rock is thrown, strikes a window and the window
breaks, the causal relation holds between that very rock and that very window –and nothing
more. Singular causation is thus distinguished from regularity views of causation. On a
regularity view of causation, the causal work is being done by the regularity –the natural
law –that governs such event types. But Armstrong notes, as many have, that this gets the
story of causation backwards. If causation is singular, then the actual causal happenings,
the token cause-effect pairs, ground the nomic regularities, not the other way around.9
We can now state clearly the central tenet of singular causation: causation is an unmedi-
ated two-place relation between two particular entities, a cause and its effect. If a particular
cause has two distinct effects, then there are two instances of causation.10 As we saw in
the previous section, the motivation driving the view is powerful. When we have some
uncontroversial instance of a causal relation, say a lightening strike that causes a house to
catch fire, there is some contingent fact of the matter as to what particular thing, the light-
ening strike, and what particular properties of the lightening strike, the voltage or whatever,
actually brought about the effect, the burning house, and the properties that the effect has.
If we accept this highly intuitive characterization of causation, then we have, as a conse-
quence, the view that causation is a relation that holds between actual first-order states of
affairs. Furthermore, according to Armstrong, the existence of any particular causal rela-
9. D. M. Armstrong, Truth and Truthmakers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004): Ch. 10.
10. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, see n. 1: 202.
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tion is entirely independent from what ever else is the case. I will explicate each feature in
turn.
Consider the first feature that causation is a second-order relation that holds between
first-order states of affairs. In his (1997), Armstrong argues that states of affairs are the most
fundamental ontological structures. They are individuated by their constituents: particulars,
properties, and relations. But this isn’t enough; the constituents of identical states of affairs
must bear the same structure. Consider an example. Take a relatively course grained state of
affairs, that John loves Anne. This has three constituent elements: the particulars ‘John’ and
‘Anne,’ and the relation ‘loves.’ This state of affairs shares precisely the same constituents
as some other possible state of affairs, that Anne loves John. However, the structure differs,
and the two states of affairs are, as they should be, distinct.11
This consequence further suggests the second feature of Armstrong’s account. The
causal relation is independent of what happens else where in the world. Generally, states
of affairs are independent from one another just in case no state of affairs entails either the
existence or the non-existence of any distinct state of affairs.12 Armstrong’s argument for
this requirement is fairly complex, and would take us too far afield. Briefly, the idea is that
the rejection of independence entails necessary connections between universals or state of
affair types. Though this seems innocuous enough in limited cases, Armstrong argues that
we are unable to temper this consequence, except in an ad hoc fashion. Such necessary
connections are multiplied beyond reason. The constraint of independence is intriguing
and worthy of investigation. However, it is beyond the scope of the current discussion and
I will assume the requirement.
11. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, see n. 1: 121.
12. Ibid.: 139, 202.
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Causation thus construed is a second-order relation that holds, contingently, between
distinct first-order states of affairs. The existence of the causal relation and the existence
of the terms of the causal relation are independent of whatever else exists or doesn’t exist.
So far, I have only laid out the very basics of Armstrong’s view. His is a rich view, and it
would be unmanageable to conduct a full treatment of it here. Instead, in the next section,
armed with a basic understanding, I will flesh out the account with respect to our current
interest, negative causation.
5.3 Armstrong Against Negative Causation
We are working with a basic conception of causation as an external, second-order relation
that holds between first-order states of affairs. First-order states of affairs are ontologically
primitive and independent from all other distinct states of affairs. Given this understanding
of the causal relation, there is a sense in which negative causation is ruled out by hypoth-
esis. Since negative causation is either an instance of an absence causing or being caused,
negative causation only exists if there are negative states of affairs. And, by Armstrong’s
lights, there are no negative states of affairs. As for negative causation without negative
states of affairs, recall the realist mantra: From nothing, nothing comes. Earlier, I dis-
cussed an ambiguity in Armstrong’s view about negative causation. He admits that some
statements of the form, ‘the absence of x caused y’ are true. However, on the interpretation
I endorsed, such statements do not express causal relations. We are now in a position to
substantiate that interpretation.
On Armstrong’s view, causal truths have as their truthmaker only first-order states of
affairs. Since we have assumed that there are no negative states of affairs, there can be no
negative causal truths. (Here I accept for the purposes of argument that truths need truth-
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makers.) We can now reconstruct Armstrong’s argument against the existence of negative
causal truths, if only roughly.
P1 If there are no negative first-order states of affairs, then there are no negative causal
truths.
P2 There are no negative first-order states of affairs.
C There are no negative causal truths.
For premise 1, we have already seen Armstrong’s argument that causation is a relation
that holds only between first order states of affairs. On the face of it, we get premise one for
free. If a negative statement of the form ‘the absence of x causes y’ is true and expresses
a causal relation, then we might – quite naturally – think that the relevant causal relation
holds between ‘the absence of x’ and ‘y.’ If we convince ourselves that there is no such
state of affairs as ‘the absence of x,’ then there exists no entity for y to be causally related.
But the story is not quite this simple; some subtleties need to be teased out. We have
introduced a new requirement for a truthmaker. It is one thing to talk about the ontolog-
ical status of the causal relation and the terms of that relation, and quite another to talk
about causal statements. Truthmakers are the ‘ontological ground’ for any true proposi-
tion; truthmakers guarantee the truth of the proposition they ground. And this guarantee is
that of metaphysical necessity. So, the truthmaker for a causal proposition is the particular
causal relation and the particular terms of that relation. As Armstrong puts it, “[T]he truth-
maker for causal truths is to be found solely in the world in which the relation holds.”13
Perhaps the requirement that the truthmaker relation is internal, hence necessary, isn’t ob-
vious. However, this is readily established. If the truthmaker relation were contingent,
13. Armstrong, “Going Through the Open Door Again,” see n. 6: 445.
90
then it would only ground the relevant true proposition in this world. If we take the truth-
maker requirement seriously, then we need to know what makes the difference. In virtue of
what does the truthmaker ground some proposition P in this world but not some other? As
Armstrong puts it,
A contingently sufficient truthmaker will be true only in circumstances that
obtain in this world. But then these circumstances, whatever they are, must be
added to give the full truthmaker.14
The upshot is that if we add those circumstances to consider the full truthmaker, we
discover that the full truthmaker does necessitate the truth of the proposition. Hence, the
truthmaker relation, if it is to do the job for which it is required, must be a necessary
relation. The requirement that truthmaking is an internal and thus a necessary relation is
surely correct, if truthmakers are required for truths at all. After all, truthmakers are the
actual entities which are supposed to guarantee the truth in question.
If Armstrong is correct, then the truthmaker for a causal truth must be first-order states
of affairs which necessitate the causal truth. Thus, if there are true negative causal state-
ments that express genuine causal relations, there must either be first-order states of affairs
which necessitate negative causal truths or negative states of affairs. Armstrong argues
against both options.
To do so, he considers a simple world, consisting of only two states of affairs, where a
is G and b is F. Straightforwardly, the truth that a is G is grounded by the state of affairs
that a is G: The actual state of affairs such that a is G necessitates the truth that a is G. How-
ever, a’s being G does not necessitate a’s not being F, and so cannot serve as its truthmaker.
Therefore, a putative negative causal statement, ‘a’s not being F caused b’s being G’ cannot
14. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, see n. 1: 116.
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express a genuine causal relation. This follows from Armstrong’s account since any puta-
tive causal truth involving a’s not being F lacks a first order state of affairs as a truthmaker.
If the putative cause lacks a first-order state of affair as its metaphysical ground, then no
statement in which that putative cause enters can express a causal relation. The idea is that
a positive first-order state of affairs alone simply cannot serve as a truthmaker for a negative
truth, since positive truths do not by themselves necessitate any negative truths.
However, there surely are negative truths of some form or fashion, and they too need
truthmakers. Since, as Armstrong argues, they can’t be first-order positive states of affairs,
negative truths must have as their truthmaker either negative states of affairs or higher order-
states of affairs. Armstrong argues for the latter. He argues that negative truths require a
second-order state of affairs totality. Return to the small world of our earlier example,
where a is G and b is F. In this small world, it is true that a is not F and b is not G. But what
ensures that these negative truths are true? Armstrong puts his answer thusly,
One thing that would ensure that the two negative truths are true would be for
the two positive states of affairs to be the only first-order states of affairs in
this small world. What sort of state of affairs would this be? It would appear
to be a second-order state of affairs: the fact that the first-order states of affairs
were all the first order states of affairs. With this fact or state of affairs as truth
maker the two negative truths, and any other negative truths that obtained in
this world, would supervene.15
If Armstrong is right, then negative truths require both first-order states of affairs and
a second-order state of affairs totality. That is, the truth that a is not F is true just in case
a is G and nothing more. The ‘nothing more’ is given to us by the second-order state of
affairs totality. We might think that it would just be simpler to posit negative states of
affairs in lieu of some second-order state of affairs. But, Armstrong argues that even the
15. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, see n. 1: 134.
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addition of negative states of affairs does not render the need for second-order states of
affairs obsolete. Even if we did admit to our small world two positive states of affairs – a is
G and b is F – and two negative states of affairs – a is not F and b is not G – we would still
need the additional fact that those four were the only first-order state of affairs that exist.
For instance, we would need the second-order state of affairs totality to ground the negative
truth that a is not H. And Armstrong is right on this point; we either require a second-order
state of affairs or face an unpalatable ontological explosion of negative states of affairs.
(Such an explosion would not be ontologically serious.) In essence, the second-order state
of affairs totality draws the boundaries for the world and those boundaries must be drawn
no matter what first-order states of affairs we admit.
If we need the state of affairs totality anyway, and we can do all the metaphysical work
without negative states of affairs, we should not posit them. On the face of it, this is bad
news for the genuinist. Once we accept the requirement that causal truths must only require
first-order states of affairs as their truthmaker, we are either forced to choose one of two
positions: Either there are negative states of affairs or some positive states of affairs alone
manage to necessitate negative truths. I think Armstrong is right on the former option.
Negative states of affairs are not only redundant but spooky. The trouble is that there seems
to be no way of tempering just which negative states of affairs we admit. It might seem
plausible to suggest that there exists some state of affairs such that Marie is not at the
conference, but, once we accept that, it seems that we must also accept that there exists the
state of affairs such that Napoleon isn’t at the conference either. Without a principled way
of delimiting just which negative states of affairs exist, we suffer an ontological explosion.
Armstrong has also rejected the possibility that some positive states of affairs necessi-
tate some negative truths. It is on this point that I challenge Armstrong. (Hence, I reject P1
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of my earlier reconstruction.) The previous sections demonstrate Armstrong’s point that
if we are to account for causation in an ontologically serious manner, negative causation
is not genuine causation. In essence, ontological seriousness requires that we find an ac-
tual, metaphysical foundation for causal claims. Without such a foundation, the genuinist
is on soft ground. In the next section, I argue that there is a class of negative causal truths
that meet Armstrong’s requirements for ontological seriousness. I argue that some nega-
tive causal statements do have as their truthmaker all and only actual, first-order states of
affairs. For this class of truths, no recourse to higher-order states of affairs totality or nega-
tive states of affairs is required. I further argue that some members of this class of negative
truths are negative causal truths.
5.4 Toward a Realist Account of Genuinism
The goal of this section is to provide an account of genuinism consistent with the demands
of Armstrong’s singular causation. I believe that accomplishing this goal will do more than
merely show that negative causation is consistent with Armstrong’s account. There are
many philosophers of causation which are unfriendly to the possibility of negative causa-
tion, but Armstrong’s account is among the least amenable to the genuinist. It is my view
that the approach I advocate in this section will be consistent with a wide variety of theories
of causation. (This more ambitious goal must be pursued elsewhere; however, as I argued
in the previous chapter, my account is adaptable to a process theory of causation, as well.)
So far, we have seen two ways that we might account for negative causation in the frame-
work of Armstrong’s singular causation. One way is to postulate negative states of affairs,
but this is surely problematic. The other way is to show that some negative causal truths can
meet the same truthmaker requirement as ordinary positive causal truths. I will accept for
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present purposes Armstrong’s requirement that causation is a relation that holds between all
and only first-order states of affairs. The acceptance of this requirement prima facie rules
out a certain kind of genuinism. We might consider a version of genuinism where the truth
of a negative causal statement ontologically commits us to the existence of absences. Such
a version of genuinism is clearly incompatible with Armstrong’s account. However, I think
that a more plausible version of genuinism need not make such ontological commitments.
The version of genuinism to be defended is that negative causal statements are very often
true and express genuine causal relations. This version is not committed to ‘absences’ as
an ontological addition.
Before attempting a general characterization of my version of genuinism, consider an
example. Take the negative claim that a is not red. I argue that this negative claim only
requires an actual first-order state of affairs for its truthmaker. The idea is this: a is not
red just in case a is, as a matter of fact, blue, yellow, etc... No second-order state of affairs
totality is required. The idea is that a state of affairs totality wouldn’t do any additional
work: a’s being blue is metaphysically sufficient for b’s not being red. Here we have a
negative truth that doesn’t need the state of affairs totality for its truth, but only actual,
first-order state of affairs.
At this stage, I should note that my proposal requires a substantive metaphysical as-
sumption: that some thing cannot – at the very same moment – be both red and yellow all
over. More generally, I claim there are certain properties which are metaphysically exclu-
sive of other properties within a certain range. Some thing’s being blue is exclusive of its
being red; some thing’s being circular is exclusive of its being square.
We can characterize the general class of such negative truths by appealing to the notion
of a contrary class. Following Ruth Millikan, a contrary class is a set of properties that are
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metaphysically mutually exclusive. When we discussed Armstrong’s small world in the
previous section, with only the state of affairs that a is F and b is G, we were led to believe
that a’s being F did not necessitate a’s not being G. This assessment is correct only if it is
metaphysically possible for some entity to be both F and G at the very same time. But if F
and G are members of the same contrary class, then a’s being F does necessitate that a is
not also G. Millikan puts the general characterization of a contrary class thusly:
Properties (monadic or n-adic) that fall into the same range are properties that
are contraries of one another. For example, whatever is red cannot at the same
time be green, what has only with atomic number seventy-nine cannot also
have only atoms with atomic number seventy- eight or atomic number sixty-
five, and what is beside a thing cannot at the same time be on top of it... [T]he
very identity of a property or property area is bound to the identity of the wider
range from which it comes, hence bound to the identity of its contraries.16
Of course, the notion of contrary classes requires the metaphysical assumption I earlier
endorsed. But I think that that assumption is well-motivated. For an atom of a particular
element to have the atomic number that it does necessitates that it does not also have some
other atomic number. Some object can no more be red and blue all over any more than it
can be both red and not red. (If one prefers to avoid talk of secondary properties, we can
easily adjust and talk of surface reflectance properties. For simplicity, I will confine my
examples to the domain of color.)
We can now consider some negative truth, a’s not being F, which has as its truthmaker
the first-order state of affairs a is G just in case F and G are members of the same contrary
class. This is the prize for the genuinist because in such cases we have negative truths
16. Ruth Garrett Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1984): 268.
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which have as their truthmaker only first-order states of affairs, and such truths can enter
into causal statements.17
To demonstrate the role that such truths might play in negative causation, consider the
following example. STOPLIGHT: A machine outputs STOP if the input is red and GO
if the output is any other color. We would say that the input a, causes output GO if a
is not red. And this, I claim, is a genuine negative causal truth – even on Armstrong’s
account of singular causation – since a’s being not red has as its truthmaker a’s being, in
this particular case, blue. And we need not invoke a state of affairs totality, since a’s being
blue is metaphysically sufficient for a’s being not red. Hence, the presumed truthmaking
relation from the state of affairs a is blue to the negative truth that a is not red is internal.
The idea is that a’s not being red has as its truthmaker only the positive state of affairs
that a is blue. This state of affairs enters into the causal relation with the effect, the output
GO, or more properly, the state of affairs that is the truthmaker for the simple proposition
that ‘the machine outputs GO.’ Therefore, the negative causal claim, that ‘a’s not being red
causes the output GO’ is true and expresses a genuine causal relation. This is in virtue
17. I should consider a complication that my approach raises, that the same state of
affairs can be the truthmaker for a variety of truths. a’s being blue is the sole truthmaker
for both the proposition that a is blue and the proposition that a is not red. But this is
consistent with Armstrong’s view. Moreover, he endorses the one-to-many truthmaker
relation explicitly: Now consider the truths that a is hot and that a’s molecules are in more
or less violent motion. The two statements are surely not the same statement: the difference
in their meaning ensures that here we have two different truths. Yet we do not have here two
different states of affairs. a’s heat is the motion of a’s molecules and, if the assumptions of
the previous paragraph are correct, no other states of affairs are implicated in the predicates.
So two truths with only one truthmaker. (Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, see n. 1:
130) Clearly, there is no general problem for a single first-order state of affairs serving as
the metaphysical ground for a variety of truths, negative and positive. The next step in my
argument is to show that negative truths of the sort I have described can figure into negative
causal claims.
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of the fact that the simple proposition that ‘a is not red’ has as its truthmaker the causally
efficacious state of affairs, the actual color of the input.
On Armstrong’s view, a statement expresses a causal relation just in case the con-
stituents of the truthmaker for that statement enter into the causal relation with one another.
This condition is met in STOPLIGHT. The state of affairs that the input is blue causes the
output GO and grounds the truth that the input is not red without appealing to negative
states of affairs or the state of affairs totality. This is negative causation at the singular
level. And the genuinist has all she needs to succeed from within Armstrong’s framework;
we have a negative causal statement whose truthmakers are all and only first-order states
of affairs that enter into causal relations with each other. In the case of negative truths
concerning contrary classes, we have just that.
If we accept the intuition that properties from the same contrary class are exclusive
from one another, than we can easily accommodate the internal truthmaker requirement for
certain negative causal truths. However, it might be objected that when we say that a is not
red, we may not mean that a is blue. We may not know the actual color of red, or, as it
might be the case for some contrary classes, we may not know of the other properties in
that class. But, a property’s membership in a contrary class is a metaphysical, rather than
an epistemic, matter. The same is true for truthmaking. We may not know the truthmaker
for any given positive truth, yet all that matters is that the appropriate metaphysical relation
holds between the truth and its truthmaker. What we mean when we assert a negative truth
isn’t the issue. Rather, the truthmaker relation obtains independent of our knowing it.
I have given the general requirements for genuine negative causal truths, and we can
take this general schema and populate a number of genuine negative causal truths to vin-
dicate our intuitions about negative causation. To start, consider our paradigm case, NO
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WATER: I fail to water my houseplant and the absence of water causes it to die. For sim-
plicity, we bracket off the issue of agential action or inaction. Consider only the negative
causal claim that ‘the absence of water causes the plant to die.’ On my view, this is a
genuine causal claim, and we can approximate the states of affairs which serve as its truth-
maker. The effect in this case is the state of affairs that is the state of the plant, i.e., that it
is dead. The cause is the state of affairs that is the actual condition of the soil surrounding
the plants roots.18 For my account to work, it must be the case that the truthmaker for the
simple proposition, ‘that water is absent’ must be only some first-order state of affairs. If
the state of affairs totality is required for the truth of this negative proposition, then my
account fails to vindicate genuinism.
I maintain that the state of affairs totality is not necessary; the first-order positive state
of affairs that is the actual condition of the soil is metaphysically sufficient for the truth of
the proposition that water is absent. The first-order state of affairs is the very amount of
moisture present in the soil. If the soil contains 25 mL of water, it cannot at the very same
time contain 100 mL of water. And it wouldn’t matter if the soil was entirely dehydrated.
‘Wet’ and ‘dry’ are members of the same contrary class; what ever is wet cannot be, at the
very same time, dry.
A possible objection to my analysis of NO WATER is that wet and dry are not con-
traries. Perhaps when we say that something is dry, we don’t mean that it is devoid of
water. We often say that soil is dry if, in certain contexts, more water is expected or re-
18. Of course, we are playing fast and loose with the causal chain that begins with
dry soil and ends with plant death. Though it would be more complicated, we could tell
a similar story about the turgor pressure of the plant that results, by osmosis from a dry
condition of the plant’s immediate environment. Fortunately, there is no need to complicate
our current case.
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quired. If expectations or requirements were different, we might say of soil in the very same
state that it is wet. (I am imagining what we might say of soil used for growing orchids
versus cacti.) This quite rightly points out that what we mean by ‘wet’ and ‘dry’ may be
contextually dependent. But this just shows that the proposition we express when we utter
the sentence ‘the soil is dry’ will be contextually determined. Our concern runs deeper.
We are concerned with the truthmaker for the proposition expressed. Perhaps, when in the
context of orchid growing, when we say that water is absent we express the proposition that
the soil contains less that 10 mL of water per 100 g of soil. In all likelihood, we express
something more vague, but it doesn’t change what we should say about the truthmaker. 100
g of soil cannot contain less than 10 mL of water and, at the very same time, contain 100
mL of water. The truthmaker for the proposition expressed is the actual state of the soil,
and the state of affairs totality is not required.
I have shown that if we accept the assumption that certain properties are metaphysi-
cally exclusive of certain distinct properties within a particular domain, then Armstrong’s
account of singular causation is consistent with genuine negative causation. It might be
objected that what I describe is not genuine negative causation. But recall the version of
genuinism I have described: Negative causal statements can be true and express genuine
causal relations. In order to express a genuine causal relation, then the truthmakers for
the causal relation given by the statement must be only first-order states of affairs. In the
cases I have described, the truthmakers for the absences are only the first-order states of
affairs. In these cases, and any case like them, the relation expressed by the negative causal
statement is a genuine causal relation.
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Chapter 6
Afterword
6.1 Back to Brass Tacks: Absences as Causes?
As I noted in the opening lines of this dissertation, causation is fundamentally about change
and the way that change is brought about. Causal claims feature intimately in our under-
standing of the goings-on of the world. We often make causal claims when doling out
praise and blame. We often cite causes when offering explanations. And we certainly de-
pend on causal reasoning when deliberating about how to bring about desirable ends and
prevent undesirable ones. Yet the metaphysics of causation is a thorny matter; causation is
as ubiquitous as it is confounding.
This dissertation has addressed a basic puzzle about causation. Very often it seems
that absences are causes or effects. That is, it seems that negative causation is genuine
causation. However, our most basic philosophical commitment about causation is that it is
a relation. And this has been well-rehearsed throughout: Relations need relata, and those
relata are missing in cases of negative causation. Something has gone awry.
Reviewing our options, we can either reject the possibility of negative causation, or
reject the relational nature of causation. For philosophers of causation who take the meta-
physics of causation seriously, these are widely regarded as the only options. I have argued
that they are not. When causes or effects go missing, we can find them. Negative causal
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claims are only negative at the level of description and language – not at the level of meta-
physics.
The crucial insight of this dissertation is that negative causal claims do not make any
ontological commitments to the existence of negative entities. For absences to be causes
and effects, there need not be any absences at all. Negative causation is genuine causation
just in case negative causal claims can be true and express genuine causal relations. In this
way, negative causation is not different in kind from positive causation.
There are, however, subtleties that need to be teased out. The most straightforward
negative causal claims are those where we cite that an absence of some thing is a cause or
an effect. For example, “An absence of water caused the houseplant to die.” Here, we need
only for the actual condition of the plant’s environment to necessitate that there is no water.
We get this quite easily, using the account I detailed in Chapter 5. The actual state of the
soil is sufficient for their to be an ‘absence of water.’ So the ‘absence of water’ is not a
metaphysical absence at all, but the actual state of the soil – an entity.
However, there is a class of more difficult cases. Refer to another example I have often
invoked, “My failure to water my houseplant caused it to die.” Cases like this involving
an agent’s failure to do something are admittedly more difficult. It seems that the very
state of the houseplant’s potting soil does necessitate that I didn’t water it, but it also seems
to necessitate that President Obama didn’t either. This, as you will recall, is akin to the
ontological explosion of causes which makes the non-relationalist account so unpalatable.
What my account needs is a way to assign ownership, of sorts, to failures to act. We
need a way to say that the particular absence of water is my failure to water and not
Obama’s. In Chapter three, I highlighted a contextualist assumption which accommodates
this need. There I argued that ‘President Obama’s failure to water my houseplant’ is a pos-
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sible description for the actual state of my houseplant’s soil, but only in bizarre contexts. In
ordinary contexts, only my failure to water my houseplant describes the actual state of my
houseplant. If, in some context, Obama did promise to water my houseplant or I otherwise
expected him to, then his failure to water it would describe the actual state of my plant.
The upshot is that there is no ontological explosion, only an explosion of descriptions, and
even this can be adequately reigned in by an appeal to the context in which the description
features.
Thus, my account of relationalist genuinism is distinguished from non-relationalism.
If non-relationalism is true, then it is true that ‘Obama’s failure to water my houseplant
caused it to die.’ The explanation is that it would be merely infelicitous to mention. On
my account, in nearly every context, it is false. Obama’s failure to water my houseplant
doesn’t cause it to die. The explanation is simple: He didn’t fail to water it. The fact that
someone didn’t water a plant does not entail that the person failed to water it. Whether
or not someone fails to do something is dependent upon context. If he didn’t fail to water
it, then there is no failure of his which could cause it to die. This requires a significant
contextualist assumption, which I have not explicitly developed or defended. To do so is a
worthy project, to be taken up elsewhere.
To be sure, a non-relationalist could employ the contextualist features of my own ac-
count to render their’s more plausible. But this is otiose. The primary motivation for
non-relationalism has been the preservation of negative causation. I have demonstrated
that we need not reject the relational nature of causation to do so. Non-relationalism is a
solution without a problem.
In this dissertation, I have helped myself to the contextualist assumption without offer-
ing a full defense of it. The central purpose has been to demonstrate that we can account
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negative causation as genuine causation without rejecting relationalism. And this much I
have done. An absence of water can cause a plant’s death and water can prevent it. I have
established my thesis by establishing that negative causation is genuine causation. A fur-
ther question, which requires additional future research, is to investigate the scope of the
thesis. A full defense of the contextualist assumption will demonstrate that it is my failure
to water my plants that causes their death, whereas Obama’s failure would cause the death
of his houseplants.
In additional to an investigation of the contextualist assumption, there should also be
an inquiry into the implications of my account of negative causation in other domains of
philosophy. In the next section, I review several of these projects, and in doing so, reiterate
some of the central motivation for vindicating negative causation.
6.2 Applications
Imagine a man who happens upon a drowning child he could easily save. In the example,
the man does nothing and the child dies. Intuitively, the man is at least partly morally
responsible for the child’s death. Such examples are meant to highlight difficulties in moral
theories that consider causal responsibility a necessary condition for moral responsibility.1
Similar problems are endemic to any philosophical account that makes essential use of
causation. Just as the aforementioned example highlights a tension between our intuitions
about moral responsibility and causation, it also highlights a tension between our intuitions
about explanation and causation. Intuitively, citing the man’s failure to act partly explains
the child’s death. But not so, if you believe that a standard causal theory is correct and that
1. For an alternate approach, see (Sartorio, “How To Be Responsible For Something
Without Causing It,” see n. 9). Sartorio argues that moral responsibility does not require
causal responsibility, even if absences can be causes.
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explanatory information just is causal information. As such, the man’s failure to save the
child can’t explain her death since he didn’t cause it.
If we accept the causal condition for moral responsibility, then the relationalist must
conclude that the man is not morally responsible for the child’s death in virtue of his not
being causally responsible. The relationalist’s challenge is to account for moral responsi-
bility in a manner that does not assume causal responsibility. As I suggested in the intro-
ductory chapter, this is no small task. It seems that the non-relationalist is on better footing
– the man is causally responsible for the child’s death. Unfortunately, so is everyone else
who didn’t save the child. The non-relationalist’s challenge is more tractable. The non-
relationalist need only provide an account of moral responsibility which distinguishes the
effects of our actions that we are morally responsible for from those that we are not. How-
ever, given the range of things that we cause on the non-relationalist account, the causal
condition of moral responsibility does little work. After all, if the non-relationalists are
correct, then we cause anything we could have prevented. The range of what we could
have prevented is relatively unconstrained.
Though it is worthy of an independent investigation, I take it that the causal condition is
well-founded and crucial to our moral reasoning. But the relationalists must work around it
and it is a minor player for the non-relationalist. I have argued throughout that preserving
the causal condition for morality, as well as causal conditions in other domains of philos-
ophy like and explanation, is a primary motivation for accounting absences as causes and
effects.
Avoiding the ontological explosion noted in the previous section is a key reason for
avoiding non-relationalism. I have also offered a prima facie case for relationalism. Non-
relationalist accounts embrace negative causation whole-heartedly, but in doing so usurp
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everything we thought we knew about causation. If it is not essentially relational, then the
causal ‘connection’ is no connection at all. Causes need not bring about their effects, and if
they do, it is merely accidental. Furthermore, if causation requires no connection between
causes and their effects, then the ‘secret connexion’ that Galen Strawson so articulately
argued for is even more mysterious. It is no connection at all.2
Once we loose the connection essential to causation, it seems that causation is no longer
able to serve the purposes for which causation is crucial. The causal condition for moral
responsibility serves to make good on the intuition that we are only morally responsible
for outcomes which we, in some way, bring about. Additionally, causation is crucial to the
sciences, in part, because we want to know how to intervene in the world. We seek to know
what will bring about desirable outcomes or prevent undesirable outcomes.
If causation is not a relation, then it is entirely unclear what causation is. Lewis most
famously maintains that causation is the ancestral of counterfactual dependence. Undoubt-
edly, this entails that causation is a relation, and rejecting the relational nature of causation
leaves a serious gap in our understanding of it. Furthermore, the structure of our gram-
matical usage of causal terms is homologous with the structure of other relational terms.
If we do not understand causation as a relation, then we are left without the resources to
understand it at all.
The primary motivation for non-relationalism is the preservation of negative causation.
If negative causation is genuine causation and negative causation inconsistent with rela-
tionalism, then relationalism is false. Perhaps the loss of relationalism is unfortunate, but
truth is often insensitive to our fortunes. This is one case where I think that truth is in our
favor.
2. Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
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Throughout this dissertation, I have resisted the non-relationalist approach as unneces-
sary. I have argued that the inconsistency of negative causation and relationalism is only
apparent; it issues from a misunderstanding of negative causation. While relationalism of
all stripes requires entities to serve as the causal relata, I have argued that negative causa-
tion does not entail that those relata are missing. Instead, I have argued that genuinism, the
view that negative causation is genuine causation, only requires that negative causal state-
ments be true and express genuine causal relations. Armed with a proper understanding of
genuinism, we are positioned to develop an account negative causation that vindicates our
commonsense judgments about particular cases without running afoul of our relationalist
commitments.
But the prize is not merely the vindication of commonsense. We preserve the role cau-
sation plays in ascriptions of moral responsibility, explanation, perception, and scientific
reasoning. In the introduction, I spoke of the central role of a causal condition for both
moral responsibility and perception. Without offering a defense of these requirements, I
highlighted both the intuitive pull of those commitments and the widespread philosophical
commitment to them. We are very often morally responsible for that which results from
our inaction, as well as that which we prevent as a result of our actions. Furthermore, there
is widespread consensus on the existence of a causal condition for perception. For it to be
true that I see my hand before me, then my hand must be causally responsible in whatever
way required by the relevant sense modality for its looking to me as if my hand is before
me. And yet I can see holes in the road (absences of pavement), and the dark room (devoid
of light).
The causal conditions for moral responsibility and perception suggest that negative cau-
sation is genuine causation in a way that goes well-beyond the mere intuitive pull of our
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judgments about particular cases. If negative causation is not genuine causation, then there
surely is no causal condition for either moral responsibility or perception. The matter of
perception makes the case most clearly: We do see holes, dark rooms, and there is a way
that complete silence sounds.
In matters of moral responsibility, the killing and letting die distinction has long been
a matter of controversy. And the difference is a difference of causation. Advocates of the
distinction contend that we are most directly responsible for consequences that we bring
about by our actions. Returning to the central example in Chapter 3, when Johnny failed
to turn off the gas, he let the explosion happen. He did not, as advocates of the distinction
would argue, cause it. My account suggests that advocates of the distinction have it wrong.
Johnny does not merely let the explosion happen; he causes it. So Johnny explodes the
room just as he would if he initiated it by more direct means. Admittedly, what I have said
sounds counterintuitive. But this is nothing more than the real intuition of difference that
I argued for in Chapter 4. In certain contexts, Johnny’s negligence might be less salient,
but not in all. It is not hard to imagine a scenario where Johnny’s negligence is all that
matters. In those contexts we say things like, ”Johnny might as well have lit the match.”
In a similar manner, James Rachels argued that the distinction between killing and letting
die is merely apparent, owing more to particular details of the case than any principled
distinction between killing and letting die.3
An interesting and productive future research project involves a more careful examina-
tion of my account in the domains of both moral responsibility – in particular the killing
and letting die distinction – and perception. My version of genuinist relationalism has im-
3. For an argument for this conclusion see James Rachels, “Reasoning about Killing
and Letting Die,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (1981): 465–473.
108
plications in both domains. It affects both what we should say about the causal condition
for each, and it will serve a productive purpose, providing the metaphysical resources to
handle difficult problems that emerge when absences are considered.
In the domain of explanation, I have argued in Chapter 3 that an adequate account
of causal explanation requires negative causation. Lewis’s account of causal explanation
only requires that a causal explanation provide some information about the causal history
of an event. If we deny negative causation, two problems emerged. First, if that causal
information need not specify causes, then nearly anything can count as a causal explanation.
The famous counterexamples which felled the D-N model of explanation turn out to be
explanations on Lewis’s account. The length of the shadow does explain the height of the
building: it tells us that the cause of the buildings height enabled the building to cast a
shadow of that length. The second problem, and I think the more troubling one, concerns
explanations of what doesn’t happen. Lewis’s account requires that a causal explanation
provide information of an event’s causal history. But, when we attempt to explain absences,
there is no event. Thus, there is nothing to explain. The natural suggestion, the one favored
by Achille Varzi, is to allow the absence to pick out the relevant event or set of events to
be explained. And this motivates the account of negative causation that I developed. If we
allow negative descriptions to pick out events – the explanandum – for explanations, then
negative descriptions should be able to pick out events – the causal relata – for negative
causal statements.
The conclusions I draw about negative explanations pave the way for a metaphysical
foundation for causal reasoning. Recent work by Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour, and Richard
Scheines, as well as independent work by Judea Pearl, develop a methodology for making
109
causal inferences based on causal models.4 Though the accounts differ in their details,
the core is similar. Each develop models which represent correlated variables that justify
causal inferences according to a manipulationalist strategy.
James Woodward provides a statement of the Manipulation Theory of Causation:
A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a (type-level) direct cause of
Y with respect to a variable set V is that there be a possible intervention on X
that will change Y or the probability distribution of Y when one holds fixed
at some value all other variables Zi in V. A necessary and sufficient condition
for X to be a (type-level) contributing cause of Y with respect to variable set
V is that (i) there be a directed path from X to Y such that each link in this
path is a direct causal relationship; that is, a set of variables Zi...Zn such that
X is a direct cause of Z1, which is in turn a direct cause of Z2, which is a
direct cause of ...Zn, which is a direct cause of Y, and that (ii) there be some
intervention on X that will change Y when all other variables in V that are not
on this path are fixed at some value. If there is only one path P from X to Y
or if the only alternative path from X to Y besides P contains no intermediate
variables (i.e., is direct), then X is a contributing cause of Y as long as there is
some intervention on X that will change the value of Y, for some values of the
other variables in V.5
On a manipulationist account, causation is taken to be a relation of variables, where
variables are properties or magnitudes that are capable of having more than one value. One
advantage of the manipulability theory is that, unlike event causation, it is clearer how to
handle non-binary variables.6 The crucial feature of such accounts is the ‘directed graph.’
A directed graph is an ordered pair < V,E >, where V is a set of vertices that serve as
variables representing the relata of the causal relation, and E is a set of directed edges
connecting these vertices. The basic idea is that some event type X is a cause of some
4. Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour, and Richard Scheines, Causation, Prediction, and
Search (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Pearl, see n. 4.
5. Woodward, Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, see n. 4: pg.
59.
6. I argue that this advantage can be had by event causal accounts as well.
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event type Y if an only if the influence of X on Y is not mediated by any other variable in
the system of interest V . So, a possible manipulation of X would change Y when all other
variables in V are held fixed. The upshot with regard to negative causation is that if the
removal of X – its absence – issues a change in Y , then the absence of X is the cause of Y .
Neither Sprites, Glymour, and Sheines, nor Pearl are concerned with the metaphysical
underpinnings of their account of causal inferences. However, it should be clear enough
that if absences are not causes nor effects, a system of causal inference that judges that
they are makes bad inferences. The value of such a system would be severely undermined.
Fortunately, I do not think that their methodology would be given to systematic error, at
least not with regard to the issue of negative causation. Nonetheless, what Woodward – a
fellow advocate of the manipulationist account – has to say about negative causation is less
than satisfying. He recognizes the ontological explosion that results from untempered neg-
ative causation. The manipulationist account would entail that President Obama’s failure to
water my houseplant is a cause of its death. As he recognizes, we need some “independent
grounds for excluding these” causes. The rationale he offers is simply that they are “not a
serious possibility.”7
This rationale simply will not satisfy the opponents to negative causation, nor should it.
We need to account for negative causation in an ontologically serious manner, for this pro-
vides us a principled rationale for excluding spurious causes. The account of relationalist
negative causation does just that. It provides the metaphysical foundation that is required
for accounts of causal inference and it does so in a way that excludes possible causes which
are not serious possibilities.
7. Woodward, Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, see n. 4: 91.
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6.3 Conclusion
The fundamental critique of negative causation is that the causal relata are missing. But
their absence is only apparent. I agree that causation requires that both cause and effect
exist, but I deny that negative causation entails that they don’t. Not only are absences intu-
itively causal, as in the contexts of explanation and moral responsibility, they are genuinely
causal. But genuinely causal absences does not require genuine absences. Absences are
only negative descriptions of entities, and those entities are the events, objects, processes,
or states of affairs that bear causal relations to one another.
I have shown that my account of negative causation satisfies the machinery of several
prominent accounts of causation. The real prize is that these accounts are – at face value –
among the least amenable to the possibility of negative causation. Though it must remain
at open question for the time, I believe that my account is consistent with any theory of
causation. It is, at base, an account of absences that is modular enough to supplement any
metaphysics of causation and powerful enough to enable causation to play the theoretical
role it must play. Whether it is moral responsibility, explanation, perception, or causal
inferences absences matter. Fortunately they exist just as ordinary positive entities do; they
are ordinary positive entities.
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